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AUGUSTINE
A STUDY IN LATIN HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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INTRODUCTION

The task which I have set for myself is to make a substantial inquiry into the nature of Augustine's historical awareness, particularly as it can be construed through a contextual study of De Civitate Dei contra paganos. The problem, of course, is a complex one with almost infinite implications. We must set down, however, that we cannot be satisfied with the myriad of universalizations on the problem that confront us at the outset of our inquiry. Too often Augustine has been sold out to a Neoplatonic caricature of Christianity which interprets the "origin, progress and deserved destinies of the two cities ...",¹ without adequate historical reconstruction of the purposes of the work, the situation to which it was written and the unique introspective consciousness of the Latin Bishop who wrote it.

Men such as Herschel Baker have called Augustine "the architect of the Christian culture that rose from the ruins of paganism" and the formulator of the medieval view of man and his relation to God.² Etienne Gilson boldly describes the City of God as a magnum opus in which "for the first time perhaps, the human reason dared to attempt a synthesis of universal history". Professor Hernshaw calls it "the first attempt to frame a complete philosophy of history It was however, a singularly unsuccessful attempt; for it contained neither philosophy nor history, but merely theology and fiction".³ Williston Walker says that "Augustine's first thought of God was one

of personal connection with a being in whom man's only real satisfaction or good is to be found; but when he thought of God philosophically it was on terms borrowed from Neoplatonism".⁴ Walker further proposes that The City of God itself is philosophy of history in which Augustine propounds among other things his theory of the ideal state which points toward the medieval idea of the theocratic state.

But these generalizations will not do. Even within themselves they are not certain what is to be meant by philosophy of history much less whether or not the terms can apply to Augustine. We therefore must reach back beyond the efforts of men and the bias of their ages utilizing their insights but not reifying their concepts. We cannot even rest with the mere identification of forms (Formgeschichte) or the mere recitation of symbols and thought structures. Our task is to grasp the nature of the assumptions which inform his use of the symbols given in his complex environment (out of which historical situation the work was produced).

It is precisely in terms of this type of inquiry that Augustine's peculiar expression regarding the dilemma of the introspective conscience is uncovered. Herein is a vital key to understanding Augustine. His Confessions according to Stendahl "are the first great document in the history of the introspective conscience".⁵ Stendahl has also carefully pointed out both the influence of Augustine's peculiar reading of Paul on the Confessions and the

extension of the Augustinian line which leads into the Middle Ages reaching its climax in the penitential struggle of that Augustinian monk, Martin Luther and his subsequent normative interpretation of Paul. It is precisely Augustine's unique self-awareness, in itself an empirical (unmediated) source for knowledge, which played a crucial role in his gropings after ultimate reality. In Augustine there was no split between how he thought of God subjectively or pietistically and how he thought philosophically (as Walker and others have indirectly implied). For it is on the basis of his discovery of himself (his knowing of himself knowing) that he undercuts the classical definition of man and grasps the fundamental elements of human selfhood as the triad of being, intelligence and purpose (existence, knowledge and will).⁶ With Augustine's assertions concerning the substantiality of this consciousness of selfhood and his subsequent search for the ἀρχή or principium of his being is born also the inextricably related task of discovering the ἀρχή or principium of history.

What is hard for us who live in the twentieth century to see is that Augustine does not seek consciously to execute a ratio scientiae. His City of God is not "methodology of history" (Croce) or "an inquiry into the nature of historical thinking" (Collingwood). Neither is it in Hegel's most general definition "the thoughtful consideration of universal history", given the conviction that the history of the world presents us with "a rational process".

Augustine is concerned with questions and issues that are beyond the scope of history as method; (the questions which all who are involved in the application of historical method must face) namely, the meaning of history as reality. For Augustine the City of God is fundamentally a religious apology pre-supposing no artificial categories which distinguish between philosophy and theology, or history and philosophy of history, or ontology and religion.⁷ He was not grasped by an academic desire to produce an updated philosophy of universal history nor was his fundamental concern to produce a scholastic metaphysic for the ages to come. I concur with the emphasis of Van Der Meer's statement:

What many readers of Augustine's writings do not realize is that his simple "cathedra" was more important to him than his pen. It was the needs and cares of ordinary Christian folk that supplied both the matter and the manner of his loftiest writings so that the main function of his genius was to serve the pastor of souls. It is not altogether wrong to say that we owe Augustine the saint to the strange and surprising fact that Augustine the genius was little more than a parish priest.⁸

CHAPTER I

THE EASTERN CLASSICAL HERITAGE

Many scholars have suggested that it is not easy to make Augustine an historian or to prove him historically-minded. At first glance this statement seems to be indeed conservative. We are hard pressed to find any educational preparation for history did not occupy a place on any recognized curriculum of school studies. Moreover, historians generally agree that historical interest fell away in imperial times. We therefore must look for some historical preparation which could cause him to invest history with the kind of significance evidenced in the City of God.

It is generally agreed that the oldest form of history in Greek culture sprang from that Ionian soil which gave birth to natural science. The word *ἱστορίη* itself evidences this Ionian origin for at inception it connotes the idea of physical research by means of empirical investigation. Hecataeus who came from Miletus in Ionia was first to focus the method of the sciences (which normally dealt with the cosmos as a whole) on the earth in particular. Where the world had been described in structural and general terms he began to direct empirical and logical procedure towards an accounting of the world's geography and ethnology. Most remarkable were his genealogical studies and his subsequent criticism of mythology which contributed to the rationalization (or demythologization if you please) of the old epic tradition by providing the basis of a thorough-going critical

mode of speculation and criticism.

Heroditus, traditionally called the Father of history,⁹ applied Hecataeus' principles more directly to a study of mankind. He, accordingly travelled extensively in his known world, studied first hand the manners and wisdom of the older Near East cultures, described the grandeur of their architecture and the glory of their royal and prominent families, and he interpreted the manifest rise and fall of their fortunes. Heroditus recorded what he had learned by inquiry "in order that the memory of the past may not be blotted out from among men by time and that the great and marvelous deeds done by Greeks and foreigners (ἑλλήνων καὶ ξένων) and especially the reason why they warred against each other may not lack renown".¹⁰ His work represented, to use a "Jaeger image", a new growth from an old epic root; where his fathers had enjoyed Homer, Heroditus' contemporaries were to enjoy his poetically alive and yet empirically controlled prose. His "philosophy of history was that of the great poets and playwrights of his time".¹¹ The idea of τροχὸς θεῶν or rota fortunae was fundamental to the unity of his interpretation which was centered in the theme of the clash between the East and West. Events move from Greece's clash with Croisus of Lydia to Xerxes' invasion. "In each case we witness the implacable nemesis chastening insolent pride (ὑψηλότης)."¹² Influenced by the metaphysics of Heraclitus and the sceptical temper of his age Heroditus retained a tragic awareness of temporal existence and portrayed man in his history as

a helpless spectator impotent to influence the course of material necessity. He was not interested in details and events as parts of any historical stream. His *ιστορίη* invariably yielded to a drift toward permanent principles governing the phenomena, a drift toward a scientific mode of apprehending reality which became even more evident in Thucydides.

Thucydides, we might say, created political history.¹⁴ With him the scope of historical investigation again became narrowed from that of Heroditus' encyclopaedic survey of the known world's culture to the sphere of influence of the Greek city state. His work was responsive to the peculiar crisis in Athen's life which had forced serious political thinkers to reach out for a larger perspective of the historical necessity that was shaping the times. The real nature of the intellectual crisis reflected in his work was not that historical writing had become political but that political thinking had become historical. The real problem was the present, not the past. Unlike Heroditus, Thucydides rejected the importance of the past history of the Greek people, for even in their most heroic achievements they had not allowed the development of large scale political organization, neither had they permitted the development of trade and commerce as it existed in his age. His eyes were the eyes of a fifth century politician. He judged all history in terms of power, possession of capital resources and wide territory supported by a strong navy.¹⁵ This criterion undercut the former ancient

historical tradition which no longer spoke with meaning to fifth century questions. The value of past history was not that it embodied any religious, ethical, or philosophical idea but that it furnished political experience.

By applying historia (as dispassionate investigation) to the changing sphere of politics Thucydides emphasized a new practical dimension in the ideal of the search for truth.¹⁶ The thrust for him was always toward general knowledge. He continually sought in his analysis to grasp for unchanging fundamental standards by which the responsible politician might transcend the immediate crisis and project a future path for the state. Accordingly he believed that the history of individuals and nations repeated itself because human nature always remained unchanged. He invested Pericles with the lofty intellect and character which could perceive these truths and authentically express the ideal Athenian spirit. Through the recorded intellectual events and speeches Thucydides' historical narrative lifted high the ideals of *Ναῦσεια* at a time when the "school of Greek culture" was crumbling before the *τύχη* of history.¹⁷

Although Thucydides' political history came into being in a situation of crisis in the life of his polis, it is clear that for him the general and permanent must always take precedence over the particular and temporal. The events in human existence are not unique and irreversible, on the contrary they can be viewed in terms

of a cyclical model and they can be interpreted in terms of eternal standards. *ἱστορίη* is always subordinated to the controlling metaphysical problem of physis; namely, the inquiry into the nature of the universe. Therefore, the precedent of the classical age of historians was of the same intellectual mettle which produced the art of Phidias and the Platonic "idea"; themselves two essentially different creations of the same intellectual type. The ideals of paideia which their histories embodied did indeed survive the fall of the Greek polis, for their home was not in history but eternity. In fact it might be observed in passing that it was the fall of Athens (and finally that of the Panhellenic society) from political power which released philosophy from its apologetical involvement in the polis to more essentialist-ontological concerns, especially in the subsequent working out of the soul's salvation within a thoroughly cosmic scheme of a divine paideusis. Likewise the frame in which the soul's true existence must be studied is not in relation to a corporate destiny of an ultimate and historical structure but rather it must be studied in terms of its essential essence.¹⁸

Plato, in his age, projected as the true ordo salutis, the soul's constant education for the true state which like the "ideas" was to be an existence in "pure form".¹⁹ It was this classical philosophical spirit which became the legacy of the Eastern Fathers in a period when philosophy as agoge (that is to say a way of teaching and a way of life) came to provide the raison d'être for the disciplined life, a new paideia of the soul.

It is within this frame of assumptions that Origen's line derives its life. While he consciously contradicts those who would equate man's sin with the soul's entombment in the flesh, nevertheless, his main concern is not with the course of concrete history as much as it was with the working out of man's metaphysical salvation. His assumptions are filled by the general paideia theme.^{19a} Dawson points out that in Origen's synthesis of Christianity and Hellenism it is impossible to deny that Origen is essentially Greek in his attitude toward history and cosmology. Human progress is still essentially conceived in terms of the Platonistic definition of man. Origen's "City of God", according to Dawson has more affinity with the world state of the Stoics than the (eschatological) Kingdom of Jewish and Christian prophecy.²⁰ It is clear to us then that the "eastern" Greek stream was flowing along speculative lines and was drawn from by Clement and Origen who were concerned with the issues of creating a speculative theology and a philosophy of religion.

NOTES ON INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER I

1. "de duarum civitatum quas in hoc interim saeculo perplexas exortu et excursu et debitis finibus". The City of God, (New York; Modern Library, 1950) XI, 1, p. 346.

Note Dods' translation itself reflects the traditional Neoplatonic description of Augustine.

2. The Dignity of Man, p. 160-161.
3. Burleigh, The City of God, p. 185f.
4. Walker, A History of the Christian Church, p. 165.

Notice the implied distinction between how Augustine "felt" about God in an individual pietistical sense and how he rationalized about God via Neoplatonic terminology (method?) borrowed for this function of his being.

5. Stendahl, "The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West", Harvard Theological Review, 56: pp. 199-215, (1963).
6. Cochrane, Christianity and the Classical Culture, p. 405f.
7. I am using religion here with the breadth of definition which Tillich uses in Theology of Culture, pp. 3-9.
8. Van Der Meer, Augustine The Bishop, p. 272.
9. Cicero first coined this title in De Legibus I, end of i: "quamquam et apud Herodotum, patrem historiae et apud Theopompum sunt innumerabiles fabulae". Theopompus has often been called the Greek predecessor of Tacitus.
10. Quoted in Sarton, History of Science, vol. 1, p. 306.
11. Ibid, p. 308.
12. Ibid, p. 308.
13. "herodotus suffered the fate which befell Mozart. His charm, wit and effortless ease have diverted attention from the note of profound sadness and pity sounded not seldom in history" (John Dewar Denniston, Oxford Classical Dictionary, p. 423).
14. Werner Jaeger, Paideia, vol. 1, p. 380.
15. Ibid, pp. 383-387.

16. Ibid, p. 388, c.f. Sarton, op. cit., pp. 314-326 and C.N. Cochrane, Thucydides and the Science of History, (Oxford 1929).
17. I cannot agree with Collingwood's harsh and superficial judgment of Thucydides in The Idea of History, pp. 30-31. C.F. the many references to the text of Thucydides in Sarton, op. cit., pp. 314-326, whose history he calls "the greatest scientific achievement of that Golden Age".
18. Republic, 608c.
19. Republic, 592b: NB. Jaeger points out that the true state exists as a paradeigma of heaven.
- 19a. See appended paper, Eros and Paideia.
20. Dawson, "St. Augustine and His Age" in St. Augustine, p. 49f.

CHAPTER II

THE LATIN HERITAGE

In the West we are faced with a distinctly different course of development to that of the East. Symptomatic of this peculiar development is the fact that while the Eastern thinkers concentrated their efforts on formulating Catholic doctrine on the level of ideas the Western Church was involved with the concrete problems of its corporate life. Behind it lay the whole tradition of Romanitas and the great Augustan age. Barrow in his perceptive analysis of Rome's achievements observes that "the Romans would willingly be judged by their history, for to them history meant deeds; the Latin for 'history' is simply 'things done' (*res gestae*)".¹ This tendency to invest the phenomenal with ultimate importance can be seen even in regard to the way $\tau\upsilon\chi\eta$ came over into Latin as Fortuna huius loci, huius diei, or haec Fortuna. Where $\tau\upsilon\chi\eta$ had been in Latte's words "the bearer of the inexorable fate that is linked to all events"², in the Latin view as Fortuna it became linked to individual persons acting or things happening, in a peculiarly temporal manner. Moreover, Fortuna huius diei seems to be without parallel in Greek.³

The singularity of one special day, particularly of a day of decisive historical or political importance, and the Fortuna assigned to it, means something definitely Roman. That reminds us at once how in Plautus the single day already has its special and non-recurring character. We remember too, how in Roman history the day and hour of death, in fact, the individual moment, as a whole, in the art of Roman triumphs and history was raised to importance hitherto unknown.⁴

One needs only to drive down the Via Appia (Antiqua) and the

Via Triumphalis or to wander about in the Foro Romano and the Foro Traiano to be immediately confronted by visible monuments which preserve the Roman regard for decisive moments that contribute to an overall unification of these individual moments into an affirmation of corporate historical destiny. For example, the Romans erected their temples to the single historical event at which time the Divine was revealed. Altheim has shown that "the vowing of a temple usually takes place at a special moment, with a particular, not recurring character; in the moment of danger (in medio descrimine) or of decision or at such extraordinary occasions as an earthquake".⁵ It is also interesting to note that when the Romans were about to storm an enemy city, the last act they performed, before the decision to attack was made, was the evocation of the enemy gods, which involved offering them house and cult in Rome if they would desert their former home.⁶

If we were to use a Platonic model loosely we might say that the relation of the gods and the "Forms" in the Republic is comparable to the relation of the gods and events (numinous) in Roman religion. A Roman deity's existence really seems to be based on its manifestation at a particular hour of history.⁷ This is not to say, of course, that we have here a theistic concept entirely peculiar to the Roman people. The characterization of a god as act is a very old and common tribal religious concept. The employment of the words numen or numina to connote divine manifestation or activity is clearly

derived from a body of religious ideas characteristic, for example, of other Italian peoples, in particular the Umbrians.⁸ What is important to notice is that this view of deity as act is taken into a peculiar nationalistic frame characterized by a sense of historical destiny which does not focus on their eternal nature but their precise, purposeful and temporal manifestation.

The Romans, then, were indeed aware of a "power" (or "powers") outside of themselves which determined the course of their living. They dealt with this reality, not in terms of an ontological principle of adequation where, for example, the eternal-rational soul was the contact point for the ultimate; but, they dealt with it in terms of an active relational principle based on the subordination of the will to a divinely appointed structure. They came to believe that if they subordinated themselves unwillingly they would then become victims of that "power" beyond them. If they refused, disaster was inevitable. However, if an individual subordinated himself willingly he could be raised to the level of a co-operator. Out of co-operation grew a sense of dedication, a concept of purpose and even a sense of mission.⁹ The Roman sense of dedication is conceived in relation to a vision of corporate personality. "Just as the genius of a family expressed the unity and continuity underlying successive generations so the genius was later made to belong to a group of men unrelated by blood but joined by common interests and purposes through successive stages."¹⁰ Therefore a general's

triumphal march through the city of Rome ended at the temple where he offered to the god "the achievement of Jupiter wrought through the Roman people".¹¹ What is especially significant about the Roman genius is its sense of radical commitment to a corporate purpose which is being worked out in the concrete events of history. Essential to this conviction was the sense of unity and continuity underlying the successive generations through which the genius was carefully maintained and kept free from pollution (lest the gods who had once given, take away). Hence we see in the mores maiorum (the manners of one's ancestors) one of the most potent forces in Roman history. These ideals are not logically and systematically projected as universal cosmos,¹² they are grounded in the things done by men through whose piety the gods favoured the nation. Hence in the Roman tradition unlike that of Thucydides the past history is of utmost importance. Neither are the issues of the present ignored through a regression into former glory. An essential aspect of mores maiorum is gravitas (a sense of importance concerning matters at hand) and constantia or firmness of purpose in immediate affairs. The depression that hit intellectual Rome in the revolutionary period before Augustus was grounded in the loss of this sense of destiny and corporate historical purpose.

Cicero, whom Augustine regarded to be the ideal rhetorician, by whom philosophy in the Latin tongue was begun and was brought to perfection diagnosed Rome's crises as resulting from a general

defection from the mores maiorum.¹³ Moreover, he constantly implored Rome to return to the obedience of the "old ways" as the basis of stability and renewal of national unity. Had not Ennius demonstrated that "Rome's severe morality and her citizens are her safe guard"? On this problem Augustine quotes Cicero as saying:

This verse (Ennius', above) says Cicero, "seems to me to have all the sententious truthfulness of an oracle. For neither would the citizens have availed without the morality of the community, nor would the morality of the commons without outstanding men have availed either to establish or so long maintain in vigour so grand a republic with so wide and just an empire. According, before our day, the hereditary usages formed our foremost men, and they on their part retained the usages and institutions of their fathers. But our age, receiving the republic as a chef-d'oeuvre of another age which has already begun to grow old, has not merely neglected to restore the colours of the original, but has not even been at pains to preserve so much as the general outline and most outstanding features. For what survives of that primitive morality which the poet called Rome's safeguard? It is so obsolete and forgotten, that, far from practicing it, one does not even know it. And of the citizens what shall I say? Morality has perished through poverty of great men, a poverty for which we must answer as criminals charged with a capital crime. For it is through our vices and not by any mishap, that we retain only the name of a republic and have long since lost the reality."¹⁴

Cicero himself aspired to the greatness which in his person would be adequate to the establishment of the order and morality of which Rome was impoverished. In the De Consolato Suo and concilium deorum he writes an epical self-eulogy. Otis has observed that he had not rethought the divine machinery of the epic and had not invested it with any "symbolic depth".¹⁵ For him poetry had become identified with lewd comedy and degenerate morality. Nevertheless he did not hesitate to utilize the epic form for a mode of political pamphleteering. Clearly, he followed an axiom of the Roman epic in general which in practice subordinated the aesthetic ideal to the ethical paideia of

Romanitas.

Virgil was the first to conceive of an Homeric-Augustan res gestae or res Romanae "breathed through" with the high aesthetic ideals of the Ars Poetica.

The Aeneid is, in one sense an imitation of Homer: it is based on the Iliad and Odyssey not only in its Homeric plot and incidents but also in its choice of an Heroic date and milieu. Virgil was the first and only poet truly to recreate the heroic-age epic in an urban civilization Only the Aeneid aspired to be both heroic and civilized, both remote and contemporary, both Homeric and Augustan. This was precisely the mad undertaking in which Virgil succeeded.¹⁶

The Aeneid is indeed a symbol of rebirth and renewal, for in it Virgil gave new breath to a form declared impossible and obsolete by Callimachus, Catullus and the contemporary age in general. Virgil himself had been converted from depressionistic scepticism to a new vision of the meaning of the old ways embodied in the Messianic figure of Augustus. Against the crumbling Republic, shaken to its foundations by civil revolt, he portrays Augustus as the revived pater familias of the Roman nation who begets children unto a new age in which the genius of his lineage will insure unity and continuity through successive generations. But this rebirth is not in any sense cyclical repetition. The grande Homeric epic underwent innovations of theme and plot and the technical literary devices became re-adapted to a new apologetic-paideutic purpose. The traditional myths and legends become subordinated to the expression of Virgil's Augustan theme in which eschatological correspondences are drawn; for example, between the pietas of Aeneas (Book IVf) and the "Messiahship" of Augustus. In the

same measure that Aeneas' life took on significance as he subordinated himself to the will of providentia, turned with gravitas from lesser love and steadfastly set his face toward Rome, each citizen can find a new sense of personal destiny in the present historical venture under Augustus.

Still, there is another essential dimension that is unique to Virgil's Roman epic, namely, the peculiar subjectivity of his style. There is no need or justification for re-treading the proofs of this fact here. Both Heinze and Otis have done it in convincing detail; yet this much can be said. If we compare Virgil with Homer it becomes apparent that Virgil deliberately empathizes with his character and narrates through them.

... the relative continuity of grammatical subject, the absence of quotations, the abundance of words with feeling tone, the deliberateness of grammatical structure, the artful onomatopoeia - receive their adequate explanation when we note that they are all necessitated by Virgil's subjective method and attitude.¹⁷

Homer, on the other hand, does not employ such devices and neither does he give any like subjectively intensified effect; rather, he shifts subjects at random, relies on the conventional aorist tense, packing details into lengthy similes and piling up idealized epithets. His characters are defined over against the reader in an objective and realistic manner. The gods intervene and they act in relation to the fated end as principles, not subjects. The heroic arete which they teach is an objective ideal, not a subjective motive. The nature of the assumed principle of adequation (regarding man and the gods) rested on

a different anthropology than that of the Roman, Virgil. It lacked the subjective-voluntaristic-affectual dimension. The great restraint of Homer's style ruled this dimension out since he had opted for a much more objective mode of expression. Virgil's epic style is then, in its sentence structure, tense differentiation, metre and choice of images much more empathetic. He intrudes into the narrative by means of that device every high school student learns to identify as "the finger-pointing epithet"; and he psychologically identifies with his characters, thereby blurring the objective clarity which Homer in his style magnificently attains. Since the whole work is subordinated to an ultimate purpose, this pre-supposed end dominates the intentions and activities of the personalities portrayed. By means of this technique he gains immediate access to the inner consciousness of his readers, subtly enlisting them for his cause.

If we compare the episode of Aeneas and Dido (Aeneid I,4) with Apollonius' treatment of Medea's "erotic" relationship with Jason, (Argonautica III,IV), the subjectivity of Virgil's style becomes even more powerful. Although the Argonautica deals with Eros' activity and Medea's subsequent passion for Jason, Apollonius maintains no continuity of narrative. He does not build an emotional relationship as a psychological history which progresses through continuous stages to a climax. The episodes are loosely strung together and separately exclusive or self-contained. For example, Eros shoots Medea who then burns passionately like a fire in brushwood; however, the next episode

does not follow, but turns to a debate between Aeetes, Argus and Jason. The Aeneid, on the other hand, moves to a mounting crescendo of emotional intensity once Venus discloses to Aeneas the exciting story of Dido's past. There is a much more logical subjective progress or process in Virgil's character development. In Apollonius' episodic structure one sees character delineation, not development, much the way short stories, as opposed to the novel, present persons without development. The paideutic ideal which the character exemplifies is outside of him in the Homeric-Greek tradition but it is subjectively immanent in Virgil. Often Apollonius' characterization in one episode will contradict that of the same figure in another. Moreover, the activity of the gods or even events is given more symbolic depth in Virgil, to the extent that they stand for realities which deeply involve the subjective life of the character and to the extent that deus ex machina is an integral part of the narrative. Notice Eros is in a quasi-Stoic (psychological) manner identified with passions in Dido who having given in to her passion is tragically destroyed as a person. When Mercury delivers Jupiter's message to Aeneas he is traumatically shaken.

... Apalled, amazed, Aeneas
Is stricken dumb; his hair stands up in terror,
His voice sticks in his throat. He is more than eager
To flee that pleasant, ^{land}awed by the warning
Of the divine command. But how to do it?
How get around that passionate queen? What opening
Try first? His mind runs out in all directions,
Shifting and veering.¹⁸

Aeneas is shocked out of his unconscious slumber induced by the Lethean waters of the passions (culpa). Via editorial intrusion, Virgil underlines the point that the resurrected pietas of Aeneas has saved him from the terrible disintegration of character which Dido experienced at the hands of uncontrolled passion. Here the love story is swallowed up into the larger cosmic paideutic schema which spells out the destiny once only vaguely discernable by the Trojan hero. Aeneas' character takes on a new firmness of patrician gravitas and self control under the impact of the call of the gods. What results is the fusion of Homeric and Apollonian elements into a new Augustan unity which possesses tremendous educational and persuasive power. But this power is not the mere product of rhetorical convention or sophisticated political pamphleteering. For Virgil, the Augustan vision is indeed the true picture of the meaning of history for his age.

Excudent alii spirantia mollius
 aera (credo equidem), vivos ducent de
 marmore vultus, orabunt causas melius,
 caelique meatus describent radio et
 surgentia sidera dicent: tu regere
 imperio populos, Romane, memento ...
 hae tibi erunt artes ... pacisque
 imponere morem, parcere subiectis et
 debellare superbos.

The Latin spirit then, is uniquely historically oriented. It was deeply concerned to paint the "doings and manners of men";¹⁹ but with a distinct moral purpose. This meant dealing not only with the present but also with the remote past in order that the moral example

of the simple uncorrupted old ways be held up before ~~the~~ present age. If Augustus was to succeed in forging his pax he had to give the old ways a new point of focus, not only by means of a gospel proclaimed through Virgil but also by means of institutional and constitutional realities. Progress and reform to the Latin spirit then was concretely bound up with the meaning of natural history. It is from this temper that Roman law is derived. The great gift of the Roman culture was indeed a broadening and a refinement to universal application of the ideals and qualities which the ancestors set before them.²⁰ It is out of this temper that Roman religion can be understood, for the meaning of this religion was in terms of history; in terms of do ut des and in terms of the particular progress of Rome.²¹

It is against this Latin world view with its peculiar set of ontological assumptions that we must view the character of Latin Christianity. Indeed the apparent inability of the West to understand the theological controversies of the Eastern Church is not due to an inferior intellect but rather a different intellectual orientation. Tertullian's cry "what has Athens to do with Jerusalem" was not the cry of ant-intellectualism. It was the voice of a different world view which recognized the fundamental issues of Christianity in terms of the concrete problems of the Church's corporate life; the regula fidei, conversatio and the preservation of the historic community as sanctified unto the truth given in the regula.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II

1. Barrow, The Romans, p. 9.

Ennius (d.169B.C.) whose Annales set the norm for the Roman epic form exemplifies this Roman nationalistic, historical pre-occupation. Although he takes Homer as his exemplar, he immediately broke with the Homeric canon which fixed heroic myth as the proper subject of poetry. The eighteen books of his poem set down the Roman res gestae in strict chronological order, the bulk of the work being concerned with modern and contemporary events (Book VII covers the Punic Wars; Book X, the Macedonian War; Book XIII, the War with Antiochus and Book XVI, the Istrian War). Brooks Otis has illustrated the glaring discrepancy between the Homeric and the historical aspects of the Annales by comparing the opening lines of Books I and X:

(I,1) Musae quae pedibus magnum pulsatis Olympum
(X,1) Inaeca Musa, manu Romanorum induperator
Quod quisque in bello gessit cum rege Philippo.

"There is no apparent effort to maintain any uniformity of style or content: myth and history, poetry and prose, the elevated and the pedestrian are not so much combined as badly juxtaposed. We can well understand Horace's complaint that this alter Homerus had taken his Pythagorean dreams and promises rather lightly." Otis, Virgil, A Study in Civilized Poetry, pp. 22-23.

2. In Altheim, A History of Roman Religion. p. 190.
3. Ibid, p. 190.
4. Ibid, p. 190.
5. Ibid, pp. 190-191.
6. Ibid, p. 191.
7. Ibid, p. 191. Notice also that genius has for its root gen. Altheim holds that it is derived not from the reduplicated present gigno, but from the aorist root (cp. gignomai and egeniomen); it therefore denotes "he who has begotten" and therewith emphasizes "the result and conclusion as the decisive element. Just as the Genius as god is always subordinated to an individual man, so is his activity related to an individual and important moment." (Altheim, p. 197).
8. Ibid, 193.
9. Barrow, op. cit., p. 20.

10. Ibid, p. 9.
11. Ibid, p. 10.
12. I am thinking here about the Greek derivation of the philosophical abstraction, cosmos from the right order of righteous government. For the Greek polis, written law was also an educational act, in fact law seems to be the most universal and permanent form of moral and legal experience.

Barrow points out that "... the Roman was not greatly interested in the coherence of a system, or in pursuing the fundamental questions of metaphysics. He was interested primarily in action and its springs and justification. Hence Roman philosophy is largely eclectic, and it is concerned chiefly with morals (Ibid, p.152).
13. c.f. Barrow, op. cit., p. 141. Brutus compliments Cicero: "for his virtues he could be compared with any of the ancients". (Ibid, p. 24)
14. From De Republica quoted in Dods', The City of God, p. 62.
15. Otis, op. cit., p. 25.
16. Ibid, pp. 2-3.
17. c.f. Ibid, pp. 62-96 for a detailed treatment.
18. The Aeneid of Virgil, a verse translation by Rolfe Humphries, pp. 98-99, (I, IV, line 281).
19. See Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 36-40.
20. It would be well for us to remember these deep cultural roots if we are to understand the depth of reality that the forensic symbols opened to the Latin mind; especially the rhetorically trained. Moreover, the ideals of statesmanship grounded in this Roman soil were to deeply influence the concept of the Bishop's office when in the Recognition Period, as the Barbarian threat increased, the Bishop came to occupy the position of tribune and city magistrate as well as head of the Christian See. See Barrow, op. cit., p. 91.
21. See Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, Part III, chapter 1, pp. 309-324. Refer especially to the section on Roman Piety. Roman patriotism itself believed that it was essentially religious. "It is by obeying the gods, O Roman, that you will rule the world, says Horace." (p. 320)

CHAPTER III

THE LATIN CHRISTIAN HERITAGE

The life-blood of Western Christianity was Roman Africa. Dawson goes as far to say:

So far as its literary and intellectual expression is concerned Africa was actually the creator of the Western tradition. By far the larger part of Latin Christian literature is African in origin, and the rest of the Latin West produced no writers save Ambrose and Jerome, who are worthy to be compared with the great African doctors.¹

Deep in the African consciousness was burned the belief in an all-powerful deity and central to their almost fanatical zeal was a fatalism of outlook and an absolute subordination of the individual will to the inscrutable decrees of God.² One of the most striking features of the African spirit was the strong nationalistic sectionalism which held its fundamental loyalties. African Christianity on grounds analogous to the ideals of Latin Paganism continued to evidence an uncompromising hostility to the institutions of the Roman Empire as they encroached upon their basic loyalties (even after the Recognition). The sharp contrast between the Church and the World was always rigorously maintained. The image of the two cities, alive in Africa long before Tyconius and Augustine, was indeed different from Origen's philosophical use of the terms. Here was a common ground rich in the elements needed to produce the schisms of Montanism, Novationism, and the Donatist Church. Here was the life setting of a people sensitive to the movements of their immediate history, jealously guarding the mores maiorum of their particular Christian heritage.

1. Tertullian

As the Latin Church became increasingly aware of its abiding destiny in the Roman Empire it was forced to develop an adequate apologetic concerning this peculiar appointment which it held over against the contemporary society. What is strikingly supportive of our study this far is the specific historical-apologetical twist the lines of argument took. Most significant here is Tertullian's case for Christianity which was philosophically grounded in the assumptions of the Latin rhetorical tradition. In this realm of discourse the appeal is made to a social (institutional) criterion of truth; the operative model being the forensic, or more specifically, the court room situation. To this extent the Rhetorical tradition is sceptical of any strict historie. The truthfulness of the testimony of the senses, so to speak, must be criticized on the basis of rational considerations (enthumema) which have been organized into logical structure or convention. Syllogistically, the rhetorical enthumema assumes its first principle and moves to persuade on its unarticulated (unwritten) basis. The consensus of the judging body subsequently decides on the truth. Tertullian's apologetic is constructed on rhetorical grounds, moreover, his rhetorical method also informs his apprehension of Christianity. He conceives Christianity as a religion whose truth is an historically revealed body of doctrine, written in the Jewish scriptures and the evangelical and apostolic writings and historically bound to a community which can trace its lineage back to the apostles in common consent with the other Christian Churches. In his

On Prescription Against Heretics Tertullian therefore points to the measuring stick which deals with heresy on an institutional and historical level:

How happy is its church, on which the apostles poured forth all their doctrine along with their blood! where Peter endures a passion like his Lords! where Paul wins his crown in a death like Johns! where the Apostle John was first plunged, unhurt into boiling oil, and thence remitted to his island-exile!... One Lord God does she acknowledge, the Creator of the universe and Christ Jesus (born) of the Virgin Mary, the Son of God the Creator; and the Resurrection of the flesh; the law and the prophets she unites in one volume with the writings of the evangelists and apostles, from which she drinks her faith. This she seals with the water (of baptism), arrays with the Holy Spirit, feeds with the Eucharist, cheers with martyrdom and against such a discipline thus (maintained) she admits no gainsayer. This is the discipline ... from which heresies ... proceeded. (one might almost say in paraphrase: This is the discipline against which heresies are defined as wild sports or falsehoods springing perversely from the grain of truth.) Since this is the case, in order that the truth may be adjudged to belong to us, "as many as walk according to the rule," which the church handed down from the apostles, the apostles from Christ, and Christ from God, the reason of our position is clear, when it determines that heretics ought not to be allowed to challenge an appeal to the Scriptures, since we, without the Scriptures, prove that they have nothing to do with Scriptures.

(Chapters 36-37)

This sample passage is breathed through with Tertullian's Latin spirit; the radical loyalty to and personal participation in the communion of martyred saints, the attention to particular events and persons and the credal symbols peculiar to the Christian Church and above all the forensic appeal to the rule of faith by which the true interpretation of scripture is judged and by which discipline the true Church is identifiably constituted. Note the primary role of the revealed rule (a convention historically authenticated and kept pure in the "courts of the church") by which he purports to prove, "without

the Scripture" that the heretics have nothing to do with Scripture. For Tertullian the rule is indeed the constitutive possessor and possession of the Christian community. In his Montanist period he raised the Rule to an absolute power.

Our Lord Jesus Christ described Himself as truth and not as custom Apart, therefore, from one immutable and irrefutable principle, the Rule of Faith, all other truths whatsoever of theory and practice admit of modification, since presumably the grace of God continues to operate and to produce results until the very end of time.

(De Virginibus Velandis, Chapter I)

The Rule of Faith in a sense becomes the essential principle which in fact organizes the Christian society in this age according to the "end" which God inevitably purposes in his final consumation. "The joker in his system" was, however, the erratic activity of his Montanist Paraclete by whom the constitution of the eschatological society was to be clearly illuminated and witnessed to. Nevertheless, we can see how his Latin rhetorical mentality influenced by the tenacious African spirit grasps truth in terms of an ordained legal structure that demands the individuals absolute loyalty and which, in return, gives the individual membership in the society which is destined to be by the true God himself. Moreover, the contact point at the level of assumption for the religious understanding of the divine Spirit of this peculiar Christian society is for Tertullian the ideas of numena and genius. The Spirit as numena or the activity of God in the particular events or times of history becomes unconsciously fused with the view of Spirit as the genius of the sect's founder. This Christian composite determines the nature of the Church's corporate personality and guarantees its

unity and continuity through successive generations.

Tertullian's opposition to philosophers in general and Greek philosophers in particular must be examined again in terms of his Latin mind-set. In the treatise, On the Soul, the argument against those who follow Socrates is structured in the following manner:

For by whom has truth ever been discovered without Christ?
 By whom has Christ ever been explored without the Holy Spirit?
 By whom has the Holy Spirit ever been attained without the mysterious gift of faith? Socrates as none can doubt, was actuated by a different spirit.

(On the Soul, Chapter I)

Conditioned by the sceptical temper of rhetoric and the general historical concerns of his Latin culture, Tertullian does not treat philosophy as methodology but as a multiplicity of historically identifiable traditions. Each philosophical school mainly exists to perpetuate and explore the thought of their founder. Christianity is seen as an alternative sect which looks not to the mind of a man for its wisdom, but to divine revelation itself. His opposition to philosophy represents a radical determination to keep the Christian tradition pure. Indeed, philosophy must be fervently opposed where it becomes the source for Christian heresy. Moreover, some of his burning hostility to the various schools of Greek philosophy is also fanned by a traditional Latin antipathy to the Greeks; "The fault, I suppose, of the divine doctrine lies in its springing from Judea rather than from Greece. Christ made a mistake too, in sending forth fishermen to preach rather than the sophist".

(On the Soul, Chapter III) We must, then, not take Tertullian's anti-philosophical attitude to be a simplistic faith versus reason dichotomy.

We cannot read the issues of the Modern natural theology debate back into his thinking. Tertullian consciously accepts many philosophical ideas and sympathetically works with them to support the universal truth of the gospel.⁴ The point of issue is raised when philosophy as a finite secta contradicts and tends to undermine the revealed body of God's wisdom as it is received in the Church.

The loyal opposition, of course, did not take this apologetic sitting down and it is clear that Tertullian himself had to come to terms with the novelty of Christianity since the premium in his society was placed on continuity with antiquity and the careful observance of the old ways so that the favour of the gods, which was with the ancestors, might also be shown to the present age. Consequently Tertullian writes about Christian Scripture:

Their high antiquity, first of all, claims authority for these writings. With you, too, it is a kind of religion to demand belief on this very ground. Well all the substances, all the materials, the origins, classes, contents of your most ancient writings, even most nations and cities your very gods themselves, your very temples and oracles, and sacred rites are less ancient than the work of a single prophet in whom you have the thesaurus of the entire Jewish religion and therefore too of ours.

... If you doubt that they are as ancient as we say we offer proof that they are divine

... All that is taking place around you was fore-announced; while we suffer calamities we read of them in the Scriptures ... the truth of a prophecy, I think, is the demonstration of its being from above.

(Apology, Chapters XIX-XX)

Further on in the same chapter the issue of time comes even more clearly into focus, "All time is one to prophecy foretelling the future. Among men, it may be, a distinction of times (shades of Plautus) is made

while fulfillment is going on ...". Tertullian, then, moves on in his argument to justify on the above grounds the eschatological awareness of the Christians for whom future, present and past are curiously related in faith.

... from being future we think of it as present and then from being present we count it as belonging to the past. How are we to blame, I pray you, that we believe in things to come as though they already were, with the grounds we have for our faith in these two steps.⁵

(Apology, Chapter XX)

What is crucial for us to see here is that the divine character of Scripture is irrefutably established both by its antiquity and by the truth of its prophecy (divinatio) of happenings in current history. The Scriptures, therefore, become the key to interpreting the meaning of present history and the norm governing activity in the present age.

We assemble to read our sacred scriptures, if any peculiarity of the times makes either forewarning or reminiscence needful.

(Apology, Chapter XXXIX)

It is the Christian's awareness of the true destiny of historical process as in the hands of the God of Scripture which on the Latins' own terms invalidates Roman theology. Roman piety is to him a sham and the objects of worship are unreal and meaningless.

See, then, if He (the Christian God) be not the dispenser of Kingdoms, who is the Lord at once of the world which is ruled, and of man himself who rules; if He have not ordained the changes of dynasties, with their appointed seasons, who was before all time, and made the world a body of times; if the rise and fall of states are not the work of Him under whose sovereignty the human race once existed without states at all.

(Apology, Chapter XXVI)

The implication of his apologetic then, is that the Romans in fact have no cause to persecute the Christians or blame them for every public disaster; in fact, it is the God to whom Christians pray who permits the Romans to rule in the first place. If the Roman rulers were really smart they should covet the Christian supplications for all those in authority, for the welfare of the world and indeed for the delay of the final consummation.⁶ Assuming the unwritten principle of do ut des, Tertullian therefore recommends Christianity to the rulers of the Roman Empire. Although his efforts were dominated by sectarian concern to guarantee the Apostolic seed or genius by rigorous enforcement of the Rule of Faith, his apologetic hinted at a church-state rapprochement which would really be improbable if not undesirable to Tertullian in his most rigorist moments. On the other hand we cannot assume that his Roman loyalties were completely dead. At any rate, it would not be too great a step for the Christians of the Recognition period to identify God's holy history with the destiny of Christianized Romanitas.

Tertullian himself remains an intriguing figure. He has been rightly acclaimed to be the founder of Latin Christianity, if indeed such an appellation is ever justified. Although his later aberrance has clouded his reputation for the history of orthodox doctrine, the Christianity on which Augustine was nourished and later fully embraced in his own unique person was deeply in Tertullian's debt. The more his importance comes clearly into focus, the less convincing Frend's insistence on the unique African-Berber mentality of Augustine's

(and Monnica's) religion becomes. It seems almost true, without exception, that there were no Berberisms in Augustine's Christianity that were not Tertullianisms and him a Carthaginian! Tertullian filled Christian forms with Latin meaning and presented them with edifying power to the African Church. His apologetic was paradigmatic of anti-modern constructs which turned Roman modernity against itself. In doing this he set up the conventional lines of apologetic which would work in his culture. His hermeneutics were informed by an institutional view of God's revelation and a political definition of the essential nature of man. If he were living today he would no doubt "out-Bright" G.E. Wright. Having inherited a Roman doctrine of institutional relativism but having opted for the Christian community he must indeed stand aggressively against Roman theology. There would be no peace with unrepentant Romanitas as there would be no peace within a Church of heterodox equivocation. As the first outstanding Latin "theologian" he gave rational content to a distinct and emerging theological tradition on African soil. Augustine would later share much of his spirit and utilize apologetical conventions. However, the times would be greatly changed, the perspective would be drawn according to a different eye-level and the man would be much more the product of the two worlds set against each other. Although Tertullian made the basic distinction between the Church as an historical community with its own eschatological res gestae and Rome as the ruling nation with its own concept of corporate purpose and destiny, he did not utilize the image of the two cities. He was not quite ready to make

the jump to that universal a level. He dealt with Christianity basically on the level of sect and not the level of city or nation with its own holy history fully established on a par with that of Rome, even though his peculiar view of the Church as sect could have in different circumstances entertained that kind of logical extension. It remained that he would deal more on the level of intra-community discipline and sectarian apologetics within the accepted ruling structure of imperial Rome, this side of the consummation. The peace and prosperity of the Empire under Septimus, Caracalla, and Geta seemed to indicate that it was favoured by divine providence and that it would continue to endure indefinitely.

"What reforms" he declares, "has this age not witnessed! Think of the cities which the threefold virtue of our present sovereignty has built, augmented, or restored, God bestowing his blessing on so many Augusti as on one! The censuses they have taken! The people they have driven back! The classes of society they have honoured! The barbarians they have kept in check! In very truth, this empire has become the garden of the world!"⁷

2. Toward a new phase in Church-State Relations.

In the third century, the Roman Empire was facing civil and economic disintegration when strenuous efforts of reconstruction were undertaken by such men as Gothicus, Diocletian and Constantine.⁸ The money economy had almost collapsed and there were periods when it seemed as if the economy would have to return to primitive barter and taxation to merely keep alive. Although Constantine introduced gold coinage to stabilize things, debased coinage was used in every day transactions and the difference of rates between the two types of coinage became a source of confusion and extortion with profound and tragic implications for the middle class. Excessive taxation became the order of the day as the shortage of manpower increased. The civil service and the military were driven to bribery and extortion in order to supplement their diminishing stipend. As the people tended to drift away from their work, the government bound the peasants to the land and even bound families to certain trades or official functions. City councils, for example, were transformed into compulsory hereditary corporations. Inflation set in and issued in the decline of bourgeoisie. Moreover, the rise of civil strife and Barbarian invasions sapped the life of the once indomitable Empire of Augustus.

Under Diocletian and Constantine the Empire's centre of gravity was moved to the East. Diocletian, with his seat in Nicomedia, did not even see Rome until 303 A.D. The princeps had given way to a monarch who removed himself from the people. The emperor's seat came under the influence of Eastern ideas, and Romanization, once the ambassador of

imperial unity, was beginning to be undermined at its head.

The senatorial class in this period of radical re-orientation lost command of the armies (professional mercenaries took over) and their hold on provincial government began to fail. Their sphere of influence as a developing clique of wealthy land owners came to be the realm of civilized life outside the Church - although they also became influential in the Church in the fourth century. They were connoisseurs of genteel living and cultivated rhetoric and poetry. Although it is true that the senate was unable to resist the power of the emperor under the principate, they remained while the emperors rose and fell. Here the old Roman genius lived on in an air of aristocratic dignity that the vulgar nouveaux dictators could not achieve by force. While Constantine, in the East, created a new heterogeneous senate, more responsive to his will and more sympathetic to his religion, the old senatorial aristocracy in the West clung firmly to its old religion and culture. They continued for a time to set the tone of Western society. In Rome itself they gathered about Symmachus and constituted the last bastion of Roman paganism.⁹

The aristocracy, also began to play an increasing role in the affairs of the Church. In fact, the Church emerged in the fourth century as a viable competitor with the State itself and attracted many of the day's intelligentsia.

The State though trying to regiment everything was not able to prevent or suppress the competition of the Church. A man could, in fact, escape from the authority of the State if he embraced the Church. If he liked power he would soon discover that there was more power to be found in the Church than in the State. The Church attracted the most creative minds - St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, Hilarius of Poitiers, St. Augustine in the West; Athanasius, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil of Caesarea in the East; almost all born rulers, rulers of a type which, with the exception of the scholarly emperor Julian, it was hard to find on the imperial throne. They combined Christian theology with pagan philosophy, worldly political abilities with a secure faith in immortal values. They could tell both the learned and the unlearned how they should behave, and consequently transformed both the external features and the inner meaning of the daily existence of an increasing number of people.¹⁰

What Tertullian had not readily conceived was indeed happening. The Church as a society **had arisen** as a real force which could rival pagan Rome. It even began to steal the thunder of the ancient Roman institutions. Violently persecuted under Diocletian, Christianity moved full circle to a position of privilege after the "Edict of Toleration", 312 A.D. Moreover, from this position of recognition the Church swiftly shifted from defense to attack. For example, just one generation after the Edict, Constantine decreed the abrogation of pagan sacrifices. Although pagan opposition modified this somewhat over-aggressive and premature act, the stage was set for Christians to fill the shoes pagans once wore. They consequently initiated their own purge of the powers which had persecuted them.

The winners became conscious of their victory in a mood of resentment and vengeance. A voice shrill with implacable hatred announced to the world the victory of the Milvian Bridge: Lactantius' De mortibus persecutorum. In this horrible pamphlet by the author of De ira dei there is something of the violence of the prophets without the redeeming sense of tragedy that inspires Nahum's song for the fall of Nineveh.¹¹

Lactantius was quickly joined by Eusebius, possibly a man of Jewish decent,¹² who with equal force recounts from Josephus the story of the siege and capture of Jerusalem and draws the harsh conclusion that all enemies of Christ must likewise perish. If Momigliano is right, and the sources seem to bear him out, the forgiving love of the Crucified Master was not the universal norm for Christian political action in this period. Neither Lactantius or Eusebius experienced much personal suffering in the Diocletian persecution, but they seemed to be expressing the resentment of the many who did. Eusebius' beloved master, Pamphilus, on the other hand, did much of his work in prison while awaiting death.¹³ That situation must never exist again! Was not the Pax Romana really the praeparatio evangelica for the Christian Kingdom of God? Or perhaps to do more justice to the emerging imperial theology; was not Rome, under the protection and guarantee of the God of Christ, becoming the Kingdom of God? Eusebius was quick to affirm that there was no conflict between Christianity and creation, which is to say in the terms of a "single-decree" theology that Christian history represented the victory of Christ over paganism. The revelation of God is, indeed, to be found in the institutions of creation. The teaching of his Ecclesiastical History centres on the historically demonstrable fact that "the eyes of the Lord are over the righteous and against those who do evil". The surest guarantee of a nation's prosperity is to be found through the rendering unto the God of history what is justly due to him.

Thus, then, men were relieved of all fear of those who formerly oppressed them and they set about celebrating with bright and festive days of feasting ... honouring first of all God, the universal King,

for so they had been instructed, and then the devout emperor with his sons dear to God; thus, there was oblivion of past evils, and a forgetfulness of every impious deed and an enjoyment of present blessings and expectation of those yet to come. Thus, then, were put forth in every place from the hand of the victorious emperor decrees full of benevolence and laws that provided evidence of munificence and true piety. Thus, in truth when every vestige of tyranny had been cleansed away, the foundation of their rightful kingdom was kept secure and without reproach for Constantine and his sons alone. And when they, as the first of all their actions, cleansed the world of hatred for God, mindful of the blessings bestowed on them by God, they manifested their love of virtue and love of God and their piety and gratitude with respect to the Deity by the deeds which they performed openly in the sight of all men.¹⁴

Eusebius' "new age" mirrors the new political confidence which Christians gained after 312. Under the persecutions and abuses of the previous period, the Church had fixed on the idea of orthodoxy as the manifestation of God's historical economy in Christ. Tertullian had opted for the Apostolic community (with its Rule) as the contact point for God's action in history and he justified the Church (living with her Scriptures) by means of the going Latin historical-rhetorical criteria. Constantine's Edict gave the fourth century Church a new confidence in the role of the civitas terrena as the essential structure within which God was revealing his will. The notion of Rome as the "eternal city", the "golden Rome" had long been common to almost all pagan writers of the period. Had not Virgil quoted Jupiter as saying:

To these (the Romans) I set no bounds in space or time;
They shall rule forever.

(Aeneid I, line 278f)

Around the year 400 the Christian poet Claudianus wrote: "There will never be an end to the power of Rome, for luxury and pride resulting in

vices and enmities have destroyed all other kingdoms".¹⁵ The correlative to being on the offense against all those who hated God was to be on the defensive concerning the power structure which made this action possible.

3. Pagan Opposition to Christianity Vivified.

The cultured Roman nobility had never really taken the early Christians seriously on a philosophical or ideological level. As landed gentry, the nobles had little contact with this low class urban movement with its maudlin Scriptures and rebellious rites. Rome had always assimilated such exotic and diverse cults into its body politic. When Tertullian and Cyprian began to articulate the Christian position in good Latin rhetoric the aloof pagan calm began to break down. When the aristocracy finally awoke to the real threat of this new society (with its own res gestae) their backs were already against the wall. It was really unsafe to be outspoken in opposition to this new foreign, yet so Latin establishment. The pagan revival which took place in the latter part of the fourth century involved a frantic attempt to revivify public faith in the accumulated ideals of Roman culture.¹⁶ The polemic carried on against Christianity was generally indirect and incidental to the positive concern for the renewal of the "old ways".

Symmachus, a true Roman senator, could see Christianity as part of the total threat now undermining the traditional establishment. Its allegiance to this God who transcended Roman destiny was the final blow

to the potency of the grande Roman creation as Augustus had conceived it. Christianity was literally Barbarianism in Roman political garb. When Gratian under pressure from Ambrose withdrew government financial support of the public cult (382) and later removed the altar of Victoria from the Curia, he and the other pagan leaders read these acts as ultimate political-religious hybris. However, in his ensuing debate with Ambrose he scrupulously avoided direct "hand to hand" combat on the rhetorical level. He could not grant Christianity its first principle and be drawn into an argument waged on their terms. He rather took the traditional Roman tact, conciliatory circumvention and assimilation.

suus enim cuique mos, suus ritus est ... (Relatio III, 8)
 uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam
 grande secretum¹⁷ (Relatio III, 10)

Let Christianity as a sect, within the larger unity of the State, freely pursue its own way to the grande secretum, according to its own customs and rites. Under the guise of religious tolerance and political non-involvement in sectarian matters he pleaded for the restoration of public cult as the essential rallying point of Roman civilization.

repetimus igitur religionum statum
 qui rei publicae diu profuit¹⁸.
 consuetudinis amor magnus est¹⁸ (Relatio III, 3,4)

When the pagans failed to prevail in the controversy their cause suffered an irrevocable set back. When Theodosius repented to Ambrose of the outrage he ordered in Thessalonica and as penance stepped up the Christian attack against paganism, all seemed lost.

However, Bloch has proven that there was considerable fuel added

to the revival when in 393 Valerius Maximianus Flavianus aided by his son, seized the leadership of Italy during the conflict between Theodosius and Eugenius.¹⁹ There is sufficient evidence to prove many who ostensibly sought Christian offices returned to the old religion. Once in control, Flavianus earnestly attempted to re-establish the old cults with the kind of evangelical fervour traditionally attributed to the early Church. St. Augustine said that Flavianus circulated an oracle which predicted the doom of Christianity in 394.²⁰ Therefore, it is clear, even with this scarce outline of evidence, that the pagan revival on the political scene was substantial and made a lasting impression, though finally crushed.

On the more strictly disenfranchised religious level Af8ldi has shown that an abundance of pagan corntiates (coin-like monuments) erected in the years from 355-60 to 410, continued to propagate the pagan cause. That they were produced after Flavianus' demise, 394, (when the last pagan army of Rome was defeated, September 6) proves the abiding strength of the pagan religions. Moreover, the pagan literati of the period were prolific and, although they generally continued to avoid open attacks on Christianity, they ardently extolled the pagan Roman cause. Valerius Maximianus Flavianus himself wrote annales in which he glorified the Roman historical tradition and in a translation of Philostratus' Life of Apollonius he popularized a pagan alternative to Christ.²¹ Macrobius' Saturnalia represented Virgil's Aeneid as a pagan Bible. The Historia Augusta also gives the Aeneid an important role.

The appeal was an appeal to history where the gods had been manifestly present in the corporate acts of the Roman people. As so often is the case, some of the most impassioned cultural apologies were produced at the point when the culture was going under. But the great Latin pagans did not die without honour. Through them much of the great Roman literature was preserved. As historiographers, they set down for all time the great historical traditions of Rome. With restrained integrity that lifted their work beyond the sentimental antiquarianism of Varro's histories, they perpetuated the classical tradition of historiography. As Momigliano has phrased it:

Though we may have learnt to check our references from Eusebius - and this was no small gain - we are still the disciples of Herodotus and Thucydides: we still learn our history of the late empire from Ammianus Marcellinus.²²

The higher forms of chronographies or breviaria did not in themselves present any real threat to Christianity, for they were neutral in character. The Christian (apologetical) historians did not attempt to embrace this form but rather, through their preoccupation with the Church's inner history, created in the wake of Tertullian, Cyprian et al. new types of history, i.e. ecclesiastical history and biography. However, the pagan revival in the West at the end of the fourth century put new pressures on the Christian apologetic. Breviaria could no longer be a superfluous form. The pagan's historical education was gaining too much authoritative effect and their version of history too much evangelical power. Although Christian historians had exploited pagan breviaria in

the past, they had no compilations comparable to those prepared by Eutropus and Festus for Valens.²³ Sulpicius Severus seems to be the first to really do something about the Christian deficiency in this area. About 400 A.D. he combined Christian chronographers, the Bible and the pagan historici mundiales. Augustine, in the midst of writing his City of God against the Pagans, commissioned Orosius to write a type of Roman brevariaria to support his critical apologetic. The City of God, itself is indeed the production of a man sensitive to his times and the times were indeed explosive. The historical problems posed by the still inadequately defined position of the Church in a society where it was gradually becoming state religio were tremendous. The big question facing the Church in the West was still the historical question. The developing Imperial theology had answered by identifying the new Christian Empire as an eschatological fulfillment within the context of Christian progress. The pagan revival was backing Christianity, as a whole, into a corner where the temptation to over-identify with Rome in opposition to pagan claims was all too real. The whole problem of God's providential dealings with men and institutions was beginning to cry for new attention. What would the Church's final answer be?

4. The Sack of Rome

In the summer, 410 A.D., Rome was sacked by the Visigothic King, Alaric. Although the city suffered little damage, the fact that Rome had fallen shook the classical world. Jerome expressed this shock in his preface to the Commentaries on Ezekiel, Book I:

When the brightest light on the whole earth was extinguished, when the Roman empire was deprived of its head and when, to speak more correctly, the whole world perished in one city, then "I was dumb with silence, I held my peace, even from good, and my sorrow was stirred". (Psalm 39,2)

While the pagans who cherished their faith in Rome as the eternal city were outraged, many Christians quaked in fear of apocalyptic judgment. They had been conditioned by a whole line of teaching from Tertullian, Lactantius, to Sulpicius Severus and Jerome that the Roman Empire was Daniel's fourth monarchy and that with its fall the end of the world was at hand. Moreover, Tertullian had popularized a tradition which read II Thessalonians 2;7 as defining the duration of the world as coterminous with the duration of the Roman Empire. Moreover, Augustine wrote in his Retractations (Book II, 68,1), "The ... pagans attempted to attribute that overthrow to the Christian religion and they began to blaspheme the true God with even more than their customary acrimony and bitterness ...".²⁶ The accusation was a conventional one but the crisis situation in which it was revived demanded an answer. Given the Latin frame of reference the real question being raised was the question of who the true God really was. Obviously the frame of reference here was not traditional Greek Hellenistic metaphysics. The answer itself must speak to the historical and institutional frame in which the question was posed.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

1. Dawson, "St. Augustine and His Age" in St. Augustine, p. 52.
2. Frend, The Donatist Church, pp. 78, 79.
3. This quote is from Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, p. 247. All other quotations from Tertullian's works are based on the texts written in The Select Library of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, volume III, (1885-1900).
4. See Apology, Chapter 21.
5. c.f. Confessions, XI, 14-28 for Augustine's treatment of time as a distentio animi in three phases. Past time is identified with memory, future time with anticipation and present time with its persisting attention.
6. Consult chapter 39 of the Apology for an example of this line of argumentation. Ad Nationes is also filled with this kind of argument. See for example, chapter 9 of Book I. It, along with chapters 40 and 41 of the Apology, represent a shorter version of Augustine's treatment in the City of God, Books I-III.
7. Tertullian, De Pallio, chapter ii, 8-9, quoted in Cochrane, op. cit., p. 155.
8. For a depth study of the situation consult Scramuzza and MacKendrick, The Ancient World, pp. 553-745.
9. Momigliano, "Christianity and the Decline of the Roman Empire" in The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, Momigliano, ed., p. 9.
10. Momigliano, op. cit., p. 9.
11. Momigliano, "Pagan and Christian Historiography in the Fourth Century A.D." in The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, Momigliano, ed., p. 79.
12. Ibid., p. 80.
13. See H.J. Lawlor and J.E.L. Culton, Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History and the Martyrs of Palestine, (London, 1928, reprint 1954), Vol. II, p. 332.
14. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, Book X, chapter 2 in The Fathers of the Church, Vol. XXIX, transl., Roy T. Deferrari, p. 288.
15. On the Consolate of Stilicho, 3, 159f, quoted in Mommsen, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, p. 267.

16. Herbert Bloch has provided invaluable research and insight into this much overlooked aspect of the fourth century. See his article, "A New Document of the Last Pagan Revival in the West", Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 199-244.

I am especially indebted to his article, "The Pagan Revival in the West at the End of the Fourth Century", in Momigliano (ed.), op. cit., pp. 193-218.

For further depth regarding the literature of this period see also Moses Hadas, A History of Latin Literature, pp. 360-445.

17. Bloch, "The Pagan Revival in the West at the End of the Fourth Century", in Momigliano (ed.), op. cit., pp. 196-197.
18. Ibid., p. 197.
19. Ibid., pp. 199f.
20. Ibid., p. 201.
21. Ibid., p. 210, c.f. p. 94.
22. Momigliano, "Pagan and Christian Historiography in the Fourth Century A.D.", in Momigliano (ed.), op. cit., p. 99.
23. Ibid., p. 86. See Mommsen, Über den Chronographen vom J. 354 (1850), partially reprinted in Ges. Schriften, vii. Text of Chronica urbis Romae can be found in Mommsen, Chronica Minora, i, (1892).
24. Ibid., pp. 86-87, 99.
25. Quoted in Mommsen, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, E.F. Rice Jr. (ed.), p. 266, c.f. Dawson, Augustine, p. 37.
26. Ibid., p. 272. For one of the finest available treatments of the pagan arguments against Christianity in the fourth century see Courcelle, "Anti-Christian Arguments and Christian Platonism: from Arnobius to St. Ambrose" in The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, Momigliano (ed.), pp. 151-192.

CHAPTER IV

AUGUSTINE AND LATIN CHRISTIANITY

Augustine could feel the crucial nature of the historical-religious dilemma confronting the Church, for he was at heart a Latin. His birth place was Thagaste, the centre of Libyan or proto-Berber culture. His father, Patricius (not baptized until just before his death) was a decurion in the Roman administration of the village. Monnica, a woman of possible Berber descent was his mother.¹ As a very devout Christian she made sure that Augustine was at birth "signed with the sign of the cross and seasoned with His salt".² At an early age she instilled in him a sense of pious subordination to the will of God as it was historically manifest in Christ's exemplary coming and the Church's regula.

Even as a boy, of course, I heard of an eternal life promised because the Lord our God had come down in His humility upon our pride.

(Confessions, Book I, xi, p. 14)

When he had fallen ill as a child, Augustine relates:

With what earnest faith I besought the piety of my mother and of the Church the mother of us all, that I might receive the baptism of Your Christ my Lord and my God The mother of my flesh ... would have proceeded without delay to have me consecrated and washed clean by the sacrament of salvation, while I confessed You Lord Jesus, unto the remission of sins: but I made a sudden recovery. This caused my baptismal cleansing to be postponed: for it was argued that if I lived I should inevitably fall again into the filth of sin: and after baptism the guilt of sin's defilement would be in itself graver and put the soul into graver peril.

(Confessions, Book I, xi, p. 14)

Augustine was then, under significant emotional pressure, exposed

to the customs of the Christian Church; but these customs were not an intellectual system any more than the mores maiorum could be considered to be a deliberate logical system.³ However, the key to a man's metaphysic is often found in his inherited set of preconceptions. To the extent that he is unable to take them into account, he is consequently ruled by them. We must never underestimate the powerful influence of his mother's piety in this regard.⁴ She continued to exercise an influence over Augustine even when the memory of her example had proved unequal to the questions posed by the intellectual milieu in which he moved as a student and teacher.⁵

His Latin Christian upbringing had imparted to Augustine a deep moral sensitivity and an almost obsessively materialistic concept of sin. The ethical discipline of the regula fidei added to a radical emphasis on Christian pietas inculcated a deep-seated awareness of man's utter dependence on the will of God. In his search for an intellectually respectable world view, the emotional and permanent impressions of his upbringing always conditioned and informed his search. Even in his relations with his mistress he was faithful, and from all records it seems that Augustine's emotional reaction to his life of dissipation was much more intense than his sinning warranted.⁶ His deep reaction to the theatres, to the spectacles of the Colosseum and the uninhibited spectacles of heathen worship deeply pricked his rigorist sense of values and issued in the bitter attacks of his later apologies.

His education led him to a deep appreciation for the great traditional Roman ideals of Cicero. Augustine had resisted the shallow values of rhetoric but Cicero was no shallow rhetorician. In Cicero, Augustine found a sense of dedication that was intellectually substantial. This piety which he had learned earlier to be ultimate value spoke with philosophical-rhetorical integrity. The reading of the Hortensius had an affect parallel to A.D. Nock's recounted conversions to philosophy.⁷

Following the normal order of study I had come to a book of one Cicero, whose tongue practically everyone admires, though not his heart. That particular book is called Hortensius and contains an exhortation to philosophy. Quite definitely it changed the direction of my mind, altered my prayers to You, O Lord, and gave me a new purpose and ambition. Suddenly, all the vanity I had hoped in I saw as worthless and with an incredible intensity of desire I longed after mortal wisdom. I had begun that journey upwards by which I was to return to You. My father was now dead two years; I was eighteen and was receiving money from my mother for the continuance of my study of eloquence. But I used that book not for the sharpening of my tongue; what won me was what it said, not the excellence of its phrasing.

(Confessions, Book III, 40, p. 45)

Philosophy then, grasped him not as the traditional Greek ontological quest but as the religious search for the True-Good, rhetorically construed within the Latin frame of reference.

Augustine's earliest work (now lost) is a case in point. The subject of the De Pulchro et Apto was aesthetics. "Beauty" he conceived as an inherent quality of an object and "fitness", a quality of relationships between objects. When, however, Augustine attempted to think of abstract incorporeal reality, he had extreme difficulty.

I turned my throbbing mind away from the incorporeal to line and colour and bulk and because I did not see things in my mind I concluded I could not see my mind. Further, loving the peace I saw in virtue and hating the discord in vice I noted the unity of the one and the dividedness of the other.

(Confession, Book IV, xv, p. 76)

Evil to him must have a real substance with a life of its own. His rigorist training to hate evil and cleave to the good was now given philosophical expression through the immediate influence of Cicero and his interpretation of Stoicism. It is this intense religious temperament which would also cause him to move over into a Manichaeian position, only to reject it finally because the morals of the Manichaeian Elect fell so short of their ideals.

Augustine also loved the poets (Virgil in particular), not because they expressed the Greek artistic ideal but because they were Latin! No doubt influenced by a general Latin prejudice, he hated Greek in his youth.⁸ Although there is coming to light evidence which indicates Augustine's ability to read Greek with considerable comprehension (especially Gregory of Nyssa and Basil of Caesarea), in his maturity it is still safe to say that Latin was his real forte. It also remains true that in his formative years the influence of Hellenic culture on Augustine was effected through a medium of Latin translations.⁹ In all his intellectual wanderings it is clear that Augustine was really seeking to come to terms with the semi-coherent body of assumptions which he inherited from Latin Christianity. This is very evident in his encounter with the Neoplatonism mediated to him through his Latin

associates in Rome and through the sermons of Ambrose in Milan.¹⁰ It was not Neoplatonism for its own sake that gripped him. He did not encounter it in a pure form. Rather it was its unexpected agreement with Christian doctrine as he had received it.¹¹ The few books that he did read says O'Meara "left Augustine in a state of spiritual elevation".¹² It was Neoplatonism that prepared him for Christianity but it did not create de novo the assumptions by which his Christianity was held. His education had given him the tools of critical thought which at first led him to doubt Christianity. Eventually, especially through Neoplatonism,¹³ these same tools enabled him to deal with perplexing intellectual problems within a frame of Christian affirmations.

His apprehension of the real content and meaning of Christianity was fundamentally Latin. For example, during the years from A.D. 393 until the writing of Ad Simplicum he matures from a youthful "parroting" of current Neoplatonic metaphysical definitions of the soul's inherent goodness to a more solidly Latin emphasis on the consequences of sin and man's absolute need of grace. In De Vero, "history is God's gradual education of the whole human race". In Ad Simplicum, "God chooses the elect on the basis of his foreknowledge of his determination of their wills".¹⁴

As Augustine matured, the tendency was always toward a more Latinate-political definition of man under the sovereign sway of God, the Almighty. Manichaeism tempted him but could never satisfy him.

Not only was its Elect ethically hypocritical but its metaphysical religious dualism was also inadequate. If we move our attention back to the rhetorical-senatorial definition of truth as consensus and place this in the context of both the Tertullian theology and the Latin ideals of Romanitas, we can see that a real dualism cannot be tolerated. Truth must be consensus. Roman destiny could not allow the existence of any viable national alternative to itself, for the gods had chosen the Roman gens. Similarly Tertullian could tolerate no division within the Apostolic community, the Church must conform absolutely to the Regula without default and it would be vindicated against Rome in the end. In short then, Augustine's inherited ideal of pietas must lead him to an absolute unity to which his will could be subordinated.

If we compare Augustine's paideusis in De Vera Religione with Origen's paideutic schema (as treated in the appendix) a number of differences become evident, even though Augustine is still (on the rebound from Manichaeism) optimistic about the place of intellection (as a free power, inherent in the individual soul) in the soul's salvation. His use of John I:1f (De Vera Religione, iii, 4¹⁵) lacks the brilliant metaphysical exegetical concerns which occupy Origen in lengthy discussion regarding the Arche and the relation of the Arche and Wisdom and God. Augustine is more interested in the Scripture's testimony to its antiquity as pre-venting all ancient history. Arche is temporally or historically interpreted. When he talks about temporal versus eternal it is not in terms of mutability and immutability

but of history and an emerging meta-history. See his treatment in The City of God, Book XI, 4.¹⁶ Augustine asks whether the prophet who writes about creation was there to see God create the world. The answer, of course, is no; but "the Wisdom of God by whom all things were made was there"! In his first stage of the paideutic ordo salutis (De Vera Religione, xxvi, 49) the soul is taught by the rich stores of history which nourish by examples. Moreover, the whole progress of the soul is considered introspectively as a personal life history within the corresponding larger context of "the prophetic history of the dispensation of divine providence in time - what God has done for the salvation of the human race, renewing and restoring it unto eternal life" (De Vera Religione, iii, 5). Directly following this introspective model Augustine makes the connection between it and the salvific history of the (corporate personality) human race as a whole. No one doubts that these two lives are related as follows:

A man can live the whole of this life as "the old and earthly man", but must associate with the "old man". For he must begin there, and must continue till death, though the old grows weaker and the new progresses. Similarly the entire race, whose life, like the life of an individual from Adam to the end of the world, is so arranged by the laws of divine providence that it appears divided among two classes. In one of these is the multitude of the impious who bear the image of the earthly men from the beginning to the end of the world. In the other is the succession of people devoted to the one God.

(De Vera Religione, xxvii, 50)

In his De Genesis contra Manichaeos, I, 23, written about 390 A.D., Augustine compared the days of creation to the stages in a man's life (from infancy to old age).

Once this connection is opened up we find the relation between the inner history of the individual person and the outer history of the corporate personality or society is a fundamental concept informing all Augustine's work. For Origen there is no historical problem and there is no real ecclesiology. The axis of his thought is different. His frame of reference is a more philosophically sophisticated Middle-Platonic schema; his focus is on the metaphysical problems of divine paideusis and the individual soul. There is no irreversible inner history peculiar to the soul as personality ; Origen is speaking in universals which transcend and determine the events which the Latins saw as unique and progressing in time toward an ordained end. Therefore we find more detachment in Origen than in Augustine (as there is more objectivity in Homer's style than there is in Virgil's). Philosophy is Origen's paideia and it is the substance of his Christianity. When he tried to describe the true nature of God he always selected (Middle) Platonic ontological categories by which he extrapolated the spiritual (anagogical) meaning from the particularized personal imagery in Scripture.

Augustine, on the other hand, was moving in the direction of a more thorough and integrated Theological Personalism. He was, so to speak, a second generation Latin Christian. The apperceptive mass he brought to Christianity was generated by Latin Christianity itself. In his historical-personalistic Theology the Latin mos maiorum now found conscious intelligible expression. When Augustine, in his maturity,

came to explicate the nature of God, he found in his struggle to comprehend the Trinity a fresh foundation for understanding the subjective nature of personality.¹⁷

Rare is the soul, whatever it says of the Trinity, that knows what it is saying.
Men quarrel, and men fight, but without peace no one sees that vision.

It would be good if men would meditate upon three things to be found in themselves These three things of which I speak are existence, knowledge and will. For I am, and I know and I will to be and to know. In these three there is inseparable life, one life, one mind, one essence: so that it is impossible to effect separation: yet the three are distinct. Let him see this who can.

(Confessions, Book XIII, xi, pp. 327-328)

Romans VII in his eyes is not a Jewish philosophy of history. It is rather the autobiography of Paul's subjective struggle with sin and conscience and subsequently becomes the model for his own Confessions.¹⁸ Augustine did not merely Christianize Plato's Republic into his City of God, as Werner Jaeger suggests, for the two cities were formed by two loves, the heavenly by the love of God, even contempt of self. The city of God is a religious symbol, not a metaphysical abstraction! The two societies are two different corporate personalities with different collective purposes.

It is therefore most important for us to recognize also that it was the largely emotional tendency to self analysis which was formed early in Augustine's childhood that was later, through education, put to more careful use. The Confessions stand as a most unique example of this. Against the scepticism of Pyrrho and the objectivity of the

classical definition of man, Augustine, on the basis of a now "critical" self-analysis, begins to come to terms with human personality in a way the Classical thinkers had never been able to. Classical reason had committed itself to a philosophical objectivity that sought to escape the passions and the flesh and find unity with the transcendent ultimate reality. This involved a choice about the nature of man that negated the passions and subsumed volition under the divine principle of reason. The issue of personal consciousness was forfeited for the higher knowledge and thus union with the ideal (Absolute). The path to the Absolute is out of the inner self through the reasonable faculty which can then find a subject-object union in the metaphysical realm. Augustine does not order the soul in this hierarchical pattern, he is not that metaphysically sophisticated. The soul is a self, triune in character. If one is searching for the classical roots of the Cartesian definition of God he need not look any farther.

... I am most certain that I am. I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived I am, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? ... Since therefore I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And consequently neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know.

(The City of God, Book XI, 26)

The substantial unity of the self functioning according to the capacities of memory (i.e. the sense of being or personal identity, intelligence, and will)¹⁹ becomes a model for understanding God.

By the principle of adequation we find that God comes up in this line of thinking as Person, the unconditioned source of Being, Wisdom and Power, in whose image the human self was created and in whose hands is the destiny of human society. Man does not know Him by reasonable demonstration; He is always beyond human comprehension, precisely because He is mysteriously closer to man than man is to himself. From God man derives his existence, the principle of knowledge, and laws of affection. It was God's grace which Augustine affirms to be guiding him throughout his own perilous life history, even when he was not aware of it! Man's consciousness of selfhood must then forever be dependent upon the Personal Godhead in whose image he is made. Out of his sense of dependence and imperfection "Augustine finds reason for recognizing God as the ἀρχή or principium of his being, thought and purpose; and belief in God assumes the character of intima scientia, a kind of inner knowledge, akin to belief in self.

It is precisely this kind of thinking that led Augustine time and again through the tortuous problem of God's prescience and man's free will. Contrary to Cicero, who sees them as irreconcilable (and thus rejects the former), Augustine can say that "the religious mind chooses both, confesses both and maintains both by the faith of piety".²⁰ Free will^{is} itself included within the order of causes which are embraced by His foreknowledge. "For human wills are also causes of human actions."²¹ "We are by no means compelled either, retaining the prescience of God, to take away the freedom of the will, or, retaining

the freedom of the will to deny that He is prescient of future things, which is impious. But we embrace both ... the former that we may believe well; the latter that we may live well."²² In Augustine's unique affirmation of credo ut intelligam he finds a partial answer to the demand for wholeness which set him on his religious quest. His intellectual convictions finally acquired an emotional strength sufficient to bring him to decisive action. The affirmation that the Christian God was the true principium meant from the angle of self-analysis "integration of personality", true felicity. Human freedom is realized in one's subordination to the laws of God who alone decides man's destiny. The gaining of felicity or the salvation of the soul is wholly dependent on the incarnation and blessed sacrifice of Christ.²³

"The Principium, therefore having assumed a human soul and flesh cleanses the soul and flesh of believers."²⁴ Augustine had moved to the level of self-aware Latinity, giving theological unity and expression to assumptions which had for centuries been the cultural heritage of the Latin West.

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

1. Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo, pp. 36, 38f.
c.f. Frend, The Donatist Church, p. 98f.

NB. Monnica is likely a Berber name. Augustine seems to have also followed Berber custom in giving his child a name connected with the worship of Baal; Adeodatus=Iatanbaal.
See Frend, Ibid, especially p. 78f for a clear portrayal of the typical Berber character. Although this issue about Berber descent is largely academic speculation, I think that there is something to be said for Berber influence in the rigorist piety of Monnica (in the sense that it reinforces normal African rigorism).

2. The Confessions of St. Augustine, translated by F.J. Sheed, Book I, xi, p. 14, hereafter Conf. I, xi, p. 141. I have put the reference in the text where possible.
3. See Bonner, op. cit., p. 39f.
4. "... I then believed, as did my mother and all our household except my father: yet he did not prevail over the hold my mother's piety had upon me She used all her endeavour, O God that I should hold You for my father rather than him." (Conf., Book I, xi, p. 14)
5. See O'Meara, The Young Augustine, pp. 33-38. Also Nock, Conversion, p. 266.
6. Conf. IX, vi, p. 192, IV, ii, p. 62.
c.f. O'Meara, op. cit., p. 55.
7. Nock, op. cit., p. 173f.
8. Conf., I, xiv, p. 17.
9. Bonner, op. cit., pp. 394-5.
10. While he was in Rome, Augustine circulated among the followers of Symmachus. He was in Rome when the great debate over the Altar of Victory arose and he grew to know first hand the pagan cause and the great history that was at stake. Symmachus himself sent Augustine to Milan under his own patronage, recommending him to the highest rhetorical post he ever attained.
11. Conf., VII, ix, p. 142-3 and x, p. 145.

Augustine's readings in Neoplatonism were mainly translations by Gaius Marius Victorinus who was an African and a Rhetor. He became a convert to Christianity himself and was one of the first persons

to attempt a synthesis of Christianity and Neoplatonism. We cannot underestimate the effect of this conversion on Augustine when it was related to him by Simplicianus. See O'Meara, op. cit., pp. 170-172.

12. O'Meara, op. cit., p. 141.
13. c.f. Bonner, op. cit., p. 80f.
14. For an excellent treatment of the development in Augustine's thought see F. Edward Cranz, "The Development of Augustine's Ideas on Society before the Donatist Controversy" in The Harvard Theological Review, volume XLVII, (1954), pp. 255-316.
15. I have used throughout Burleigh's translation of De Vera Religione in the Library of Christian Classics, volume VI.
16. The text I have used throughout is The City of God translated by Marcus Dods in The Modern Library Edition. For convenience I have, where possible cited the reference in the text.

NB. The creation of the world is invested with all the character of numena as an unique act in space and time. God's act in creating history is normative for the realm of space and time where man lives, moves, and has his being.

17. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, p. 403f and Bonner, op. cit., p. 432.
18. There is a sense in which Augustine is able to use Pauline images in the typological-historical manner. For example, note the use of the old man imagery in De Vera Religione, XXVI, 49 - III, 5f. However he is not of course tuned in to the precise Pauline apologetic. The tendency is usually to exegete Paul introspectively especially in Romans VII.
19. De Trinitate, X, 11, 18. Notice Augustine is inconsistent in the terms he uses to describe the triad of selfhood. We must remember that he never ordered the self in a strict hierarchy of being in which the different levels were distinct from each other. We must wait for Thomas Aquinas to do this.
20. The City of God, V, 9.
21. Ibid, V, 9.
22. Ibid, V, 10.

23. That is to say God in Christ historically offers a true and perfect sacrifice once and for all. (The City of God, X, 24). Here Romans 12:1 is interpreted introspectively with liturgical anticipations of the Thomistic doctrine of habit peaking through. Moreover, the whole subjective sacrificial emphasis is here bequeathed to Western sacramental theology. As the individual is to sacrifice himself, inwardly, in pious transformation (re-direction of resolve) and active, outward verification of what is the good, perfect pleasure (will) of God; so also, the corporate personality, "the whole redeemed city ... is offered to God as our sacrifice through the great High Priest, who offered Himself to God in His passion for us, that we might be members of this glorious head, according to the form of a servant This is the sacrifice of Christians: we being many are one body in Christ. And this also is the sacrifice which the Church continually celebrates in the sacrament of the altar, known to the faithful, in which she teaches that she herself is offered in the offering she makes to God."
24. Ibid, X, 24.

CHAPTER V

AUGUSTINE AND HUMAN HISTORY

Augustine's analysis of himself in his Confessions was at the same time an analysis of the history of his experience. By investing his individual experience with meaning, he likewise invests the experience of the race with significance. His serious regard for the matters at hand (gravitas) of course was not his own invention, neither is the consideration of his experience or the past experience of the human race a unique insight. It was part of his Latin heritage.¹ The affirmation that the Christian God was the principium of his being was at once the affirmation that He was the principium of the history of all mankind. When as a Bishop² he defended the true faith against pagan criticism he was able to attack the very foundations of their argument because he shared their basic assumptions.

On the basis of their do ut des principle he proves in detail by means of Rome's own history that stupendous calamities came upon Rome "before ever Christ came in the flesh". In his argument he conceives the corruption of manners and vices of the soul rampant in Rome before Christ's coming, a far worse catastrophe than the recent sack. Moreover in Book II, chapter 5, he shows that some of the worst obscenities were practiced in the worship of the pagan gods. In chapter six he goes on to prove that the pagan gods never inculcated holiness of life, in fact the poets even attest to the fact that Jove himself was adulterous. Even philosophy with all its benefits is not given to divine sanction.

There is no question in Augustine's mind that the average pagan would not even consider whether or not he should stay to hear Cato or go to the "divine" orgy. The issue at stake for Augustine in the City of God (part I), is not the validity of the do ut des principle. It is the question of who is the true God and who belong to the gens which participates in his genius. For the Hebrews, the test of a true prophet was whether or not history sustained his ribh. Similarly for the Romans the test of the true god was whether events favoured those who worshipped him. By his mass of evidence,³ Augustine contended that the pagan gods did not act on Rome's behalf when she duly worshipped them. Yet the pagans attribute none of the past disasters to their gods but in the Christian era worship them in order to escape "lesser calamities".

Augustine contends that the Christian God is the true God of history. In Book IV, 33, He is the One who gives earthly kingdoms to both good and bad. He does not deal fortuitously with men. He is the loving God of Christ, not impersonal fatum! Neither is He dominated by an order outside of Himself, but over all things He rules as Lord and appoints as governor.

At all points Augustine undercuts the pagan position by going them one better on their own terms. He ultimately rejects the fact that Rome was ever a republic since, on the basis of Cicero's own definition, true justice never reigned. In fact, for Augustine there is no justice "save in that republic whose founder and ruler is Christ".⁴

The terror of Marius was allowed, not by the Minturnian goddess Marcia, but by the secret providentia of God:

... that the mouths of our enemies might be shut and that they who are not lead by passion but BY PRUDENT CONSIDERATION OF EVENTS might be delivered from error.⁵

Augustine, throughout the first ten books, carefully undermines the whole philosophical foundation of Romanitas. Even the glory that Rome experienced (itself sinful) was allowed by God, firstly, because Rome ruled in a generally commendable fashion, suppressing baser lusts in order to gain the praise of men; but more important, He allowed Rome's kingdom so that:

... the citizens of that eternal city, during their pilgrimage here might diligently and soberly contemplate these examples, and see what love they owe to the supernal country on account of life eternal, if the terrestrial country was so much loved by its citizens inspired by human glory.⁶

The true God of "all things done" then is not the God of Rome, his gens did not consist of the citizens of Rome, his reputation did not rest on their fate. For Augustus, the true God was (through Christ), the ruler of the heavenly city. He clearly indicates that the people who share his genius are the body of elect, redeemed by Christ. His gens is made up of those who are pilgrims in the Roman Empire, living in confident expectation of a heavenly country. Christians are not to commit the pagan fallacy and despair at the sack of Rome; rather they should cleave to God all the more!⁷

But God is not without historical witness in the past. Truly, He

was in the beginning before Rome ever came into being, creating and directing all history according to his purposes. Christians are pilgrims who follow mores maiorum historically accounted in the written authority of God. Herein is revealed God's ius gentium. Herein are recorded the promises of God to his people, vindicated once and for all in Christ's coming. Herein are "the things done" by the ancestors who were citizens of an earthly Jerusalem. Their deeds and their kingdom existed ahead of time as prefigures of that which was promised. They were saved (proleptically) in anticipation of the Christ. Their relation to the heavenly city is typologically construed as an eschatological correspondence.

The exortu et excursu of this nation is of heavenly design. The history of Abraham's seed and David's lineage, to whom Christ in these recent times has come, is no mere allegorical ghost. Its history has the same integrity for Christians as the res gestae of pre-Augustan Rome had for Christianity's revived pagan opposition. As Symmachus had attempted to assimilate Christianity into the Roman body politic, Augustine's historical metaphysic assimilated Roman history into the providence of the Sovereign creator-God.⁸ Against those pagans who scoffed at Christianity's foolish preoccupations with invisible things, the historical exortu et excursu of the city of God pointed (not to speculative and invisible projections of demented fanatics, but) to a concrete debitis finibus yet to come.⁹ Against those who falsely believe that God's predestination of all things necessitates a recurring, cyclical

reality in which all things have already existed, Augustine says:

... far be it I say, from us to believe this. For once Christ died for our sins; and rising from the dead, He dieth no more. "Death hath no more dominion over Him;" and we ourselves after the resurrection shall be "ever with the Lord" to whom we now say as the sacred Psalmist dictates, "Thou shalt keep us, O Lord, Thou shalt preserve us from this generation". And that too which follows is, I think, appropriate enough: "The wicked walk IN A CIRCLE;" not because their life is to recur by means of these circles, which these philosophers imagine, but because the path in which their false doctrine now runs is circuitous.

(The City of God, Book XII, 13)

On the other hand, Augustine carefully retains the African pre-Recognition distinction which distinguished Rome and the Christian society as two separate cities. He rejects the contention that by its conversion Rome had become the city of God. No! the two cities are in hoc interim saeculo perplexas. Their generative and constitutive characters were as different as piety and impiety, humility and pride, love of God, even the contempt of self and love of self, even the contempt of God. In their progress they have been confused together, especially in the immediate Christian empire. However, their inevitable ends will be as different as their constitution, for they will be separated as in threshing, the wheat is separated from the tares. This should be the Church's answer to the attacks of the pagans, especially concerning the sack of Rome. It is not for the Church to be preoccupied with Rome's history or with computing the time or season of God's final consummation on the stage of Roman history. Rather, as Bishop, Augustine courageously identified and interpreted for the Church, while Romanitas

crumbled, the unique heritage and the heavenly mission from which the Christian society must not swerve if it was to inherit its destiny.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

1. See chapters II and III, pp. 9-31.
2. The City of God, Book II, i-v.
Note in the outline of his purposes, preface Book I, Augustine does not conceive of his apologetical task separate from his pastoral duty. He is at all times a Bishop concerned with all his capacity for the cure of souls.
3. The City of God, Book III.
4. Ibid, Book II, xxi.
5. Ibid, Book II, xxiii.
6. Ibid, Book V, xvi, 166.
7. Ibid, Book I, preface.
8. c.f. Tertullian, Apology, XXVI, quoted above on p. 28.
9. c.f. Ibid, XX, quoted above on p. 28.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It seems almost presumptuous to conclude this study at a point when the issues are just beginning to open up. However, I have consciously chosen to approach Augustine via the indirect background route as opposed to a narrowed piece-meal analysis of his writings per se. This piece-meal analysis would, in fact, violate Augustine's own introspective spirit to say nothing of my own sensibilities. Hopefully, it is now clear that this quite remarkable African Bishop cannot be understood in terms of the general Christian cosmology given in the traditional line through Clement and Origen. The more we dealve into the Latin world view, the more we become convinced that Augustine's thinking is informed by a set of characteristically Latin assumptions. Unlike Clement and Origen, or Tertullian for that matter, Augustine was a second generation Christian. This is important for many reasons, the least of which is not the fact that Christianity was first communicated to him in the form of primary emotional and permanent impressions by his intensely pious mother. In a word, he did not graft Christian symbols onto a foreign stem, the roots themselves drank from Latin Christian waters. The synthesis which he accomplishes is not primarily the synthesis of Christianity and Neoplatonism. Rather his synthesis is fundamentally between Latin Christianity and itself on a new level of awareness. His conversion was a returning again to a Christianity which had made him restless until he grasped it with the new self-aware freedom of a reformed rebel.

As a rhetorically trained Latin, fully aware of the old Roman ideals, he proved by their own history that the pagan criticisms of the

Christian society could not stand up. As a Latin Christian he could state in a new unity of meaning what the Romans had long unconsciously felt about history. Moreover, he had finally found a means of giving full expression to the individual while still retaining the Roman sense of corporate historical destiny.

We have seen that in Origen the emphasis fell on the training up of the rational soul through successive, non-temporal, stages of somatic transcendence to a state of felicitous contemplation of God (who is still essentially beyond personal being). The Latins, on the other hand, tended to subordinate the individual to the destiny of the corporation. The corporation was, in turn, believed to be in the hands of an impersonal fatum which tended to negate rather than nourish a higher valuation of personality. The problem can be illustrated by Virgil's treatment of Aeneas. While Virgil creates him as a vital historical person by means of his characteristically subjective style, there is a distinct stylization of his character which takes place after he leaves Dido and piously sets sail for Italy. His great subjective depth of the passionate Aeneas gives way to a new idealized Roman who moves with one dimensional gravitas and constantia into the larger destiny of the Roman Empire. Like most writers in the West, his "bad guys" are more convincing than his "good guys". But this is due finally to the sterile and non-personal definition of the governing Good.

Augustine, under the rubric of God's absolute sovereignty,

embraces impersonal fatum within the personal Godhead. Finally, it is not only the volitional self-subjugating aspect of man which becomes the adequate contact point for the impersonal coercive power from beyond; now the whole person is opened up to a reality which is unified in the personal Godhead.

In conclusion, we must hasten to say that Augustine's emerging personalism is not of the modern nominalist-epistemological cut. For him, like Plotinus, Origen and Plato, the general is ontologically prior to the particular. His cogito ergo sum does not affirm human self-awareness as the principium and therefore it is not the criterion of all Truth. No! God as principium is the first person believed and the last person doubted! The Holy Trinity is the principium of the power of self-aware personhood itself! The undifferentiated levels of the individual soul are derived from and are coherent with the levels of total reality, the sum of which is unified in God, who is ultimate reality (if we might borrow a phrase from a later Augustinian). Augustine's total metaphysic is, or at least strongly tends towards, a personalism that must at once be historical in a thoroughly Latin sense. The history of the individual soul's progress is necessarily tied into the progress of the species of which it is a part. The life of the Christian soul is given true fulfilment as it corresponds and harmonizes with the history of the heavenly city that moves according to God's personal providence.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

EROS AND PAIDEIA

This appendix represents previous research in which I have tried to explore some of the implications of Koch's and Jaeger's justifiable emphasis on the significance of divine paideusis for early Christian thinkers. The concept of philosophy as Paideia in Origen I believe is an important nuance in the general Paideia theme. One really feels (after reading Origen in particular) the extent to which philosophy is not only the spelling out of the divine ordo salutis but doing philosophy, or perhaps we should now say doing theology is a primary discipline by which the soul, particularly of the spiritually-minded, is lifted to God. Also, I hope that this will add further content to the distinctly unhistorical soteriology and I might add ecclesiology (to the extent that you find any explicit ecclesiology) in the non-Latin theologians.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no thesis in the era of modern historical theology has gained more popular assent than that which Anders Nygren has set forth in his treatment of Agape and Eros. His "motif-analysis" (Kultur-Kritik) has been a significant stimulus to creative investigations which both negate and affirm his position. He has also stimulated me to grapple with the dimensions of meaning connoted by the symbol Eros in the great Alexandrian father called Origen. This work does not, however, represent an attack or defense of Nygren's position for I have no interest in debate, my interest is in the significance the meaning of Eros has for Origen. Yet, perhaps, this much should be said about Nygren at the outset; in retrospect, it is clear that Nygren, for all his awareness, has grossly oversimplified the Christian and Greek traditions by his "motif-analysis". Informed by modernity's

persistent desire to discover the essential first principle of a thing so that it may be organized as a unity of meaning on that level (as all reality is finally ordered), Nygren has opted for a deductive "motif-analysis" based on the category of the religious apriori. Christianity and the Hellenistic religious Conglomerate are dialectically opposed as two peculiar "Geister". This opposition is concretely expressed in their controlling idea; Agape (Christianity); Eros (Hellenistic religion). Moreover, he also invokes modernity's reactionary dichotomy of realms (Barthian fashion) by placing, of course, his Christian motif as authoritative revelation over the Hellenic natural knowledge. The end thereof is, then, directed to a defense of the Reformed Faith that has attempted to strip off the Hellenic crust which Catholicism has liberally perpetuated, following the disruptive synthesis of the two opposing "spiritual worlds" in the Hellenization of Christianity.

The purpose here is to examine the idea of Eros; as it relates to Origen's concept of the training up of the soul. This also means, Nygren notwithstanding, that we must be free to examine the two edged nature of Eros, not only as it applies to the soul's longing after the Divine but also to the Divine's dealings with the soul. Part of the hidden agenda which immediately compels me to open up to this kind of possibility (aside from normal reactions to Swedish Historical Theology) is the methodological awareness that we cannot universally impose the method of demonstration on the ancient

Platonic tradition. That is, we cannot imply that man invariably started with the affirmation of the unique reality of his own individual existence as e.g. rational and proceeded by the method of logical demonstration to the testing of all that is other than self by the self's indubitably held criterion (God, Forms, etc. being the first thing doubted and the last thing believed). This assumption has often, it seems, limited the meaning of Eros to the soul's acquisitive drive to grasp reality outside of itself for itself. Yet among basic affirmations in the Platonistic tradition especially, is that Being precedes Knowing, that the universals are the first realities believed and the last things doubted. The soul's ascent is a return to a state of former glory or perfection purposed and sustained by the Ultimate, not a path projected by idealizing will toward a future of novel, self-generated possibilities. Moreover, the structure of reality was not conceived as a unity of meaning on one level but as a hierarchal multiplicity of meanings in which the (non-spatial) levels of the soul immediately corresponded to levels in reality. All that is, is derived from the ultimate (at the apex of the hierarchy) in which each level takes into itself the fullness of the lower. In Plotinus for example, sin is privation and distance from the $\Pi\alpha\tau\eta\rho$, one moves to a unity of fullness as he ascends to God (the One); one does not categorically bracket out or sacrifice the "lower" for the "higher".

What this kind of scheme can mean for exegesis is immediately

clear in Origen. Scripture is, metaphorically speaking, a living soul; tripartite in nature.¹ A scripture passage is not demythologized² by the allegorical or by the anagogical method - the literal level is not bracketed out by the psychic nor is the psychic by the spiritual. A phrase of scripture, or religious symbol, is for him as a note sounding with all its partials. This is clearly demonstrated in his Commentary on John, Book I, 16. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος has at least six (spiritual-psychic?) meanings. Christ is modified by a multiplicity of phrases all pointing beyond themselves to his being as Wisdom in the archē. In fact Origen criticizes those who would reject the rich diversity of descriptive titles attributed to Christ and opt for one as most important. He is aware of "scholarly" tendencies towards subtle hypostatizations (of Christ's titles) with the result that the rich diversity which illumines his character is lost to one concept.^{2a}

The force of what this (reductionist-Platonistic) line implies, therefore, is a kind of fullness given in the hierarchy which is realized as the lower level (σῶμα) is given to the higher (πνεῦμα).³ The meaning of Eros within this hastily suggested scheme of Being and Knowing⁴ is rich indeed. To the contemplation of this richness we hopefully proceed.

PART I

1. Eros, the gods and the question of creation in Plato

On frequent occasions, perhaps most memorably in Phaedrus (247a), the Timaeus (29d-30d) and at the end of the second book and at the beginning of the third book of the Republic, Plato has identified the supreme goodness of Divinity as action without trace of jealousy or grudging (φθόνος).¹ In the Phaedrus Plato characterized the gods as comparable to men in that their souls can be likened to a charioteer and two horses. However, the gods' horses are both good. Since the charioteer who is the reasoning element (τὸ λογιστικόν) is in complete control, the souls of the gods attain to the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος where (beyond space, time and motion) they behold the forms without distraction. Moreover, in this state the gods under the direct impact of the Forms require no power of ἀνάμνησις to recapture them. Their souls become wholly characterized by the Forms. Plato has moralized the gods under the Forms and thereby has endeavoured to save them for the religious health of the State against the attacks of poetic blasphemy. The gods cannot cause evil in this scheme:

... Neither then, could God (ὁ Θεός) ... since He is good be the cause of all things... For good things are far fewer with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God.

(Phaedrus II, 379 C.D.)

Although the gods are obviously undergoing moralization for specific purposes in Plato² they become within his apologetic more than

mere contemplators of the Forms. Virtue is communicated to them as they behold absolute justice, temperance and knowledge. In heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot "goes first arranging and caring for all things". Similarly in his description of the wings of the soul they are pictured as nourished for growth by beauty, wisdom and goodness. Here the very means by which the soul ascends to the dwelling place of the gods is nourished and given growth by the Divine.³ One more observation must now be made. The Phaedrus derives its unity from a controlling concern with the subject of rhetoric not the problem of Eros, divine madness, or the nature of man. His point is that the orator's function is "psychagogy": his real art is not so much dressing up words as influencing souls.⁴ As the Republic aims at training statesmen, his paideia in the Phaedrus aims at the training of orators and writers. That Eros is discussed is, as Jaeger points out, only accidental to this overarching paideutic concern. However, in countering those who have mistaken Eros for the subject of this dialogue he tends to weight the argument too much in the other direction by denying the Phaedrus' value as a source for the doctrine of Eros. By the conjunction of rhetoric and philosophy, form and intellectual content, power of expression and knowledge of truth⁵ he has made the true comprehension and articulation mandatory. Moreover by using the concept instrumentally Plato has said something about Eros. He has spoken about it's educational value relating it to the doctrine of the nature of the soul.⁶ It must be emphasized that (ecstatic) Eros according to Socrates's speech "is given by the gods for our greatest

happiness".⁷ Eros possesses the soul and drives it beyond itself to follow the god to which it is most akin and to gaze upon pure Being.⁸ Those who would psychologize Eros into a mere desire of the human soul must come to terms with the giving-daemonic character of Eros as Socrates' new rhetoric affirms it and attempts to persuade men to receive it.

We have spoken above, about the gods (Θεοι) and the creative-giving nature of Eros; in this regard, let us now examine the nature of the Demiurge in the Timaeus. Cornford has scorned those who have attributed to Plato's Demiurge "the most characteristic revelations of the Founder of Christianity".⁹ In rejecting the notion of "overflowing creation", A.E. Taylor propounded, Cornford is rejecting that Plato held Goodness as the desire to produce perfection. However, in his book From Philosophy to Religion he has written:

It is the old religious necessity, realized long before by Pherekydes, who said that, when Zeus set about making the world, he changed himself into Eros. This Desire is the mythical Demiurge of the Timaeus, who, being good and therefore without jealousy (φθόρος), desired that all things should be as like unto himself as possible. This is the most sovereign cause of becoming and cosmic order....¹⁰

Here in the Timaeus "myth" Cornford has not only clearly related Goodness and the desire to disseminate goodness and to bring order out of chaos (that all things be good and nothing evil), but he has also identified this the Demiurge as Eros. This desire is not Nygren's religious apriori - the desire for eternal life, it is a creative giving or overflowing; but not just for the sake of overflowing. The

Divine architect faces a "visible discordant and disorderly motion". He responds to the models which characterize his very Being as goodness desiring to order this chaos by imparting goodness (dispelling evil).¹¹

Rist has quoted Armstrong in this regard, as saying; "For Plato being good means doing good".¹² He further asserts regarding the Demiurge problem:

... $\epsilon\pi\omega\varsigma$ can be a desire, as Armstrong says, "to increase good and beauty". And it is precisely an increase in good that is the aim of the Demiourgos who wishes to make everything as like himself as possible....

... The Demiourgos acts from motives akin to, though not actually called $\epsilon\pi\omega\varsigma$. But surely he is not desirous of immortality! ... If $\epsilon\pi\omega\varsigma$ must be self-centred and the Demiourgos has a motive like that of $\epsilon\pi\omega\varsigma$, the dilemma is unanswerable.¹³

Indeed, self-centred Eros on the non-appetitive level is an unanswerable dilemma. Even if the Demiurge was projecting his own self-generated ideals, to increase good and beauty for selfish ends is a self-contradiction. But it is clear that the Demiurge is not "his own boss" even though he as a god is filled with the goodness and beauty of the Forms. Moreover, he is not the creator of his eternal models, he is a god who operates creatively in response to those eternal Forms. He desires and is moved to creatively bring order out of disorder, creating rest where there was but discord. The construction bears great similarity to the $\text{N\epsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma}-\epsilon\pi\omega\varsigma$ motif where Love and Strife are motive causes in the cosmic cycle.¹⁴ The difference is, as we asserted above, that the architect of order and rest operates - not in terms of the category of process but under the impact of the Eternal

Forms which are 'beyond being' although he as a god is not.

It is clear to me therefore that the usual definition of Eros as a passion directed upwards to ultimate Forms or an upward movement of the soul is not for Plato the whole of it. There is a plenitude that is prior to and embraces the soul, that passionately moves toward it. There is an "overflowing" connotation in the idea of Eros, a unifying, a setting at rest, not inconsistent with the etymological root *ἐράω* (only found in compounds) meaning "I pour out".¹⁵

2. Eros, the Good and God in Origen

To study Eros in Origen's thought is to be confronted with a new sophisticated stage in Hellenic Christianity's theological struggle to understand itself and to speak this understanding with apologetic force. The categories of thought and symbols of affirmation which the tradition mediated to the Alexandrian school was heterogeneous. The effort to order and comprehend the inner meaning of the authoritative documents received, was a task to tax the most adept genius.

Clement, who consistently used Stoic categories in his account of God, had extreme difficulty relating his philosophical faith to the anthropomorphic imagery in Scripture which at various points directly attributed *πάθος* to God. Was this not the same as attributing sin

to God? The infinite Reason must be ἀπαθής, αἰθερος, ἀντιθέμενος which is to say by a Christian modification in the Stoic definition, sinless. In the Paedagogus (1,2,4, 1-2) Jesus' soul is described as ἀπαθής and he who acquires ἀπαθεια signifies true knowledge of the truth through Christ. Within his definition of God, Clement only allows those πάθη such as pity (itself a down-flowing feeling) which does not obviously implicate God in sin.

However, Origen militantly opposes Stoic ideas (especially corporeal-materialism) as enemies of true Christian philosophy. He devotes the whole first chapter of De Principiis, I, to show the incorporeal, spiritual nature of God. In his Homilies on Ezekiel 6:6 he rejects ἀπάθεια as an attribute of God.

Quae quoque ipse ... multum misericors
et miserator, nonne quodammodo
papat? Ipse Pater non est impassibilis

Origen, as a Christian, believed in the Scripture's God who loves with personal love. However, he was, at this point, seemingly caught in a bind, for under Platonistic categories the Absolute was ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας¹⁶ as were the Platonic Forms ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. And yet it seems from a reading of Commentary on John and Contra Celsum or the Commentary on Song of Songs and De principiis that he could simultaneously assert God is love and God is beyond Being.

The apparent gulf between these two assertions is bridged by Eros.¹⁷ The clue to the structure of this bridge lies in Origen's

personalized doctrine of the God-head (particularly the Father's relation to the Son) as it is informed by given Platonistic models. Perhaps this is no where more clearly portrayed than in Origen's Commentary on John, I:1. Working under the impact of a characteristically Platonistic interpretation of Proverbs 8:2f, the Word is considered to be in the Arche. But the meaning of Arche is multiple in philosophy and in Scripture and has been variously used in regard to the Word, the Son, the Christ and Wisdom. For Origen, however, Wisdom "is anterior to all the thoughts that are expressed in the titles of the first-born of every creature" (I:22). Logos (Christology) is dropped by Origen "like a hot potato" with the same immediate reflex that made him avoid anagoria and what we have instated is a Wisdom-Christology.¹⁸ The Word is in the Arche, not prior to it. Christ is the Demiurge as a beginning (Arche), inasmuch as He is Wisdom. "It is in the virtue of His being Wisdom he is called Arche"¹⁹ (I,22). Continuing his allusion to the Demiurge Origen writes:

For I consider that as a house or a ship is built and fashioned in accordance with the sketches of the builder or designer, the house or ship having their beginning (Arche) in the sketches and reckonings in his mind, so all things came into being in accordance with the designs of what clearly was to be laid down by God in wisdom. And we should say that having created, so to speak ensouled wisdom, He left her to hand over from the types that were in her, to things existing and to matter the actual emergence of them, their moulding and their forms. (I,22)

God then, who is beyond being (or at least transcendent in relation to the soul's existence as the Forms transcend those who contemplate them), has ensouled his very designs (ideas) as Wisdom who

is the first creative principle of God's ways. But it is clear that what Origen is referring to here is not merely a metaphysical creation detached from all else of religious significance. It is clear that Wisdom stands at the beginning of all the ways of God's redemptive dealings with "things existing and matter". Wisdom exists for the purpose of their "actual emergence". Christ as the righteous λόγος who brings "life" (true life) imparts life only by virtue of his being Wisdom. In this way also, he can be the light, the teacher, the way, the truth etc. The movement is from God who has created wisdom the beginning of his ways. The Demiurge (Son of Man) is not good in himself. He points to the Father who will manifest in His works His name, the Good (I,30).

It is at this juncture that we are reminded of the whole 'hook up' in Plato between Eros and the desire "to increase good and beauty". The fact that Origen speaks of God as the Good in his discussion of Christ's function as Demiurge further reveals his allegiance to Plato (at the level of assumption). In addition, it is common knowledge that Neoplatonism used the term το ἁγαθόν in an impersonal key to describe the One. Origen, on the other hand, frequently uses ἡ ἀγαθότης, perhaps in conscious contrast to the Neoplatonists.²⁰ This is characteristic of his personalization of the Platonic Forms which Plato had already arranged in a hierarchy under the Good. The connection which Neoplatonism made between το ἁγαθόν and the ὁ εἷς within an impersonal, deterministic system of emanation, Origen as a Christian,

who regarded John's gospel to be the first-fruits of the four,²¹ easily moved to connect goodness and love²² within a personalized realm of discourse.

In making this connection he was not breaking with his Platonistic philosophical tradition for reasons of faith. On the contrary he was pointing it beyond itself. In his thought the impersonal, non-appetitive, down-flowing side of Eros gained a new dimension of religious meaning which it lacked outside of Christian "Personalism". It would do well for those who lament his "Platonization" of Christianity to remember that he also Christianized Platonism. His rapprochement between the Good (the one) which is beyond being and the God who is Love was a happy event that anticipated and transcended what Plotinus would later struggle to do in his philosophy.²³

NOTES ON INTRODUCTION AND PART I

1. Grant. The Letter and the Spirit, p. 94.
2. Perhaps I am using "demythologized" in a somewhat cavalier way here. I intend it to mean the somewhat positivistic effort to reduce a term to the one semantically meaningful definition that it can have, given a strict criterion for truth on one level. For example, this is what Bultmannians in fact try to do in their submission of myth to modern existentialism's psychologizing categories of meaning.

This is not, however, to imply that there is no order or clarity for Origen's language. The hierarchical structures orders the religious value of scripture's language; "Its flesh is the literal meaning which the simple believer can understand. The soul is understood by the less simple. Its spirit is made known to the believer who is truly spiritual". Ibid, p. 94.

- 2a. Commentary on John, I, 23.
3. See Ibid, I, 9, p. 301 and op. cit., pp. 94-5, 103. Consult also the relation of simple apostolic tradition and the spiritual truths to be discovered in De principiis, I, 8, 1.
4. I say "hastily suggested scheme" because my purpose was not to carefully delineate a world view but rather express a feeling or impression of a reality alive at many levels. Lovejoy's Great Chain of Being communicates this in a more scholarly fashion although I would want to see the hierarchal plenitude as somewhat more dynamic and flexible.

PART I

1. See Gould, Platonic Love, p. 163f.
2. See in Dodds' The Greeks and The Irrational, p. 219. Plato's proposals for reforming and establishing the Inherited Conglomerate.
3. Phaedrus, 246E.
4. Jaeger, Paideia, III, p. 192.
5. Ibid, p. 191.
6. Phaedrus, 245c-246a.
7. Ibid, 245 B-C.

8. Phaedrus, 247C.
9. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, p. 206 and Timeaus, 29E.
10. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 34.
11. Compare the role of the Demiurge with the role of Eros in the thought of Empedocles. Guthrie has clearly set forth this dominant and creative cosmic role in his History of Greek Philosophy, vol. II; Love and Strife, pp. 152-9; causation, pp. 159-66 and the cosmic cycle, pp. 167-180. The implications herein which we cannot treat are very suggestive and support my interpretation of Eros.
12. Rist, Eros and Psyche, p. 34.
13. Ibid, p. 37.
14. Consult Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, II, pp. 152-180.
15. Rist, op. cit., p. 41.
NB. Herein are the seeds of Plotinian emmanicipation in Plato.
16. Contra Celsum, 6;64, 7;38. Commentary on John, 19;6 of De principiis, 1;1 and De principiis, 1,2,9.
17. Rist, op. cit., p. 198.
18. i.e. when Logos is used it is now peculiarly posterior to Wisdom.
19. Compare this with "For Christ the only begotten Son is all in all. He is the beginning in man he assumed, ...", Commentary on John, I,34.
20. Rist, op. cit., p. 207.
21. Commentary on John, I,6.
22. Regarding Origen's use of the terms Eros and Agape I have seen no evidence that convinces me of any antinomy between the terms, neither am I convinced that Origen has utterly sold-out Agape to erotic abasement. The Platonistic Eros which he knew was not merely a sublimation of physical passion that reaches out to the Good; it was also downward flowing, albeit in an impersonal metaphysical sense.

Rist has pointed out that ἔρως (for Origen) is not used by Scripture where it might mislead the weaker brothers. op. cit., p. 206.
23. Ibid, p. 82f.

PART II

1. Philosophy as Paideia in Origen

In our treatment of Ἔρως in its divine dimension we have pointed out Origen's philosophical dependence on Plato at certain salient points. From our brief comparison of Plato and Origen's works themselves, it is clear that Porphyry must have been right (in spirit at least) when he recorded that Origen lived with Plato constantly and read the entire literature of the preceding generation's Platonists and Pythagoreans.¹ This living with philosophy filled his effort to articulate a positive religion which took as its constituent norm divine revelation truly given in holy writ. Following the precedents of Philo and Middle Platonism and the Stoic schools he applied his peculiar three-dimensional method to the Christian texts. There is here a real sense in which Origen earnestly sought, not only to stave off the objections of Christianity's cultured despisers who were abhorred by the crudities of this low class religion (with its C minus scriptures), but also through anagogy he desired to exalt the Christian scriptures as the normative expression of truth over all other venerated documents (including Plato). Regarding Origen as a teacher, Gregory Thaumaturgus told of how Origen urged his students to become lovers of wisdom under the rubric that only the true philosopher was capable of a life worthy of rational beings.² Philosophy was for Origen both λογος and βίος. He like Socrates would also have been criticized by Callicles for allowing philosophy to dominate his whole life.³ It is in this connection that we see Origen's philosophy not only as providing the tools for philosophical speculation but also as paideia, filling the whole of his being.

For Origen, Greek philosophy was his culture. It drove him beyond philosophy as recapitulation of the old Greek worthies to an exciting new dimension where philosophy could comprehend Truth, directly given by God in Scripture. It was Paideia which influenced him to write thus:

The holy apostles, when preaching the faith of Christ took certain doctrines, those namely which they believed to be necessary ones, and delivered them in the plainest terms to all believers, even to those such as appeared to be somewhat dull in the investigation of divine knowledge. The grounds of their statements they left to be investigated by such as should afterwards receive through the Holy Spirit himself the graces of language wisdom and knowledge. There were other doctrines, however, about which the apostles simply said that things were so, keeping silence as to how or why; their intention undoubtedly being to supply the more diligent of those who came after them, such as should prove to be lovers of wisdom, with an exercise on which to display the fruit of their ability. The men I refer to are those who train themselves to be worthy and capable of receiving wisdom.⁴

Here was Paideia in a Christian key; a Paideia which provided the ground on which he conceived his identity as a Christian Educator and Theologian;⁵ a Paideia which was written into the very structure of the given (according to Divine pronoia) ordo salutis.

Although many scholars have perceived the influence of Greek philosophy on Origen's thought (witness E. de Faye and R.A. Norris Jr.) the great Danish historian Hal Koch was the first to identify the idea of divine paideusis as fundamental for Origen's whole theology. Koch's comprehension of this fact provides a key to the inner unity of Origen's interpretation of scriptures. Koch's findings which were based primarily on an extensive reading of the primary material itself, fit most naturally into the whole history of Greek Paideia which Werner

Jaeger has subsequently given us. Jaeger writes that Origen's doctrine of the divine education of mankind "is one of the most striking proofs of the power of that tradition which enters a new stage of its history".⁶

2. Eros and Paideia

In Part I of this paper we have treated Eros in Plato and Origen as an idea which connotes dimensions of meaning that the usual pseudo-psychological (Platonistic) caricature brackets out. The focus was primarily on the idea itself. However, it is precisely this kind of narrowed concentration which leads Nygren's motif-analysis into such distressing conclusions. We are admonished then in the conclusion of our study to project Eros into a larger constellation of meaning; namely, the over-arching Divine paideusis. Let us recall the Platonic assumption that Being precedes Knowing as a fundamental axiom for philosophy. For him Eros is not then a function of knowing but an element of Being. In maturity Plato came to affirm the Good as the highest form, determinate for right order in the realms of Being. That is to say that all political, social (professional) and religious realms were ordered and related as Paideia under the Good. As early as Lysis, we can catch a glimpse of a full view of Eros expressed in the Symposium and the Phaedrus:

Every kind of society must be based on an inner standard established in their souls and by the law of the supreme Good which binds together both the world of men and the whole universe.⁷

In the Gorgias Plato rejects the doctrine of the right of the stronger and teaches that human society must be part of a supreme harmony of all things ordered by one ultimate standard.⁸ In his Symposium he attempts to bridge the chasm between Apollo and Dionysus. The inexhaustable dynamic of man's irrational powers was not to be neglected or negated but given true expression in the spiritual illumination possible in the creative contemplation of the Good. In the Symposium, Plato unites Eros and Paideia. Aristophanes, who speaks before Socrates in the dialogue, explains Eros as a man's metaphysical yearning after wholeness originally natural to man in a previous state of Being and Agathon (following Aristophanes) gives us a Narcissus-like reflection of Eros as the fairest of the gods. Plato relates Eros to philosophy: as Eros stands between absolute wisdom and utter folly, between Plenty and Poverty, so philosophy also stands between wisdom and ignorance. Eros as metaphysical striving after wholeness is significantly recast as the epitome of all human striving after the Good. Jaeger observes that "Eros - interpreted as love for the Good is at the same time the urge towards self-fulfillment and is therefore the impulse towards education and culture in the truest sense".⁹ In the stages of ascension in the "mystery" of Eros, Eros is the force which educates the lover to the knowledge of beauty in its truest form. In this state of illumination, Eros in him becomes able to educate others. In the same way the soul which has ascended to the Light outside the cave goes back into the cave to teach. The Good becomes in the truly educated the inner existence which moves their souls to love

others.¹⁰

Origen, for whom philosophy is Paideia, clearly stands within this tradition. When he came to deal with the Song of Songs, it was the content of this paideutic faith that stimulated him to apply Philonic methods of Allegory, not merely his trained awareness of the tool. As Koch has said, the Song of Songs was shot through with the Greek Eros concept for Origen¹¹ and the work truly is meaningful to him in the context of his paideutic view of Eros. The Church as the immature bride of Christ (soul on the pneumatic level) yearning for the Bridegroom (Logos) is taken up into the paideutic ordo salutis and understood under the impact of the affirmation that God has chosen the bride by the word in the Arche. Indeed the very movement of the soul to God is given by the One who has chosen it.¹²

The soul is moved by heavenly love and longing when, having clearly beheld the beauty and fairness of the Word of God it falls deeply into love with his loveliness and receives from the Word himself a certain dart of love.¹³

Similarly in his metaphysical cosmology (an Origenist capsule Timeus) in De Principiis, Book I: 5,1; 6,2 and 8,1, man's way to God is cast in the structure of a cosmic Paideia. It is through the ceaseless work of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, on our behalf that man renewed at every stage in his progress, may perchance succeed at last in beholding the Holy and Blessed Life (Book I: 3,8). Plato in his Laws had described God in relation to the world thus; "God is the pedagogue of the whole world".¹⁴ In Origen, God creates the world as a schoolhouse for the training up of all souls unto the true

life of blessedness. The Logos was not a Stoic hypostatization, he is $\delta \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \text{ (}\tilde{\eta}\nu\text{) } \pi\rho\omicron\varsigma \tau\omicron\nu \Theta\epsilon\omicron\nu$.¹⁵ For Origen, the Logos is turned to God in contemplation and therefore receives the illumination of the Divinity (as the Demiurge received illumination for creativity from the Forms). This illumination is "Eros diffusivum sui"; the crux of a paideutic subordinationism. The state of illumination of the perfect $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \text{ (}\pi\rho\omicron\varsigma \tau\omicron\nu \Theta\epsilon\omicron\nu\text{)}$ is the stage at which perfect Eros becomes redemptive. That the Logos becomes flesh is not the result of his turning away from God (the Good), it is a direct result of unimpeded contemplation which itself implies creativity within the predicament of fallenness in the order of being. In the Logos' "enmanment" is the ultimate affirmation that the $\sigma\tilde{\alpha}\mu\mu\alpha$ and the material world is a grace given by the Pedagogue of the Universe; the ultimate affirmation that the very longing of the soul after God is God's paideutic call of man to himself.

The difference between Origen and Plato is that Origen's images of union are filled with very personalized type of mysticism which is missing in Plato. The Christ (bridegroom) really does love the longing bride with a personal love as God in his goodness really loves his creation.¹⁶ Moreover, Origen does not hesitate using ecstatic and erotic imagery to describe the relation of the Logos and the soul. For him, Eros, even in its physical state is the paideutic providence ($\pi\rho\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\iota\alpha$) of God written into the very structure of Being.

NOTES ON PART II

1. Porphyry, in Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History, VI, 19, 5-8.
2. Oratio panegyrica (Migne PGX, col. 1069f) referred to in Jaeger, Early Christianity and the Greek Paideia, pp. 51 and 130.
3. Gorgias, 484C.
4. De principiis I; Preface 3.
5. Compare this statement with the above quote to see just one instance in which Origen clearly shows that Paideia filled his conception of the meaning of his tri-partite exegetical method which he received from Philo et al. The anagogy truly tells us where man ends his strife. (Quo tendas anagogia)
6. Jaeger, op. cit., p. 136.
7. Jaeger, Paideia II, p. 175.
8. Gorgias, 507e-508a. Is this not a judgment on the German 'will to power fixation' that has also informed the Eros caricature as base desire sublimated as arete.
9. Jaeger, op. cit., p. 192.
10. We must keep in mind the meaning of Eros for pederasty in this regard.
11. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, p. 34m.
12. Notice especially the relation of the Good to Eros!
13. Commentary on the Song of Songs, Book I, Prologue.
14. Laws, X, 897b.
15. Commentary on John, 2:2.
16. Perhaps the closest model to this in Classical Education would be the Pederastic Morale - masculine love as a method of education.